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Executive Summary
For the first time, an assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) contains a chapter dedicated to investment 
and finance. These are the chapter’s key findings:
Scientific literature on investment and finance to address cli-
mate change is still very limited and knowledge gaps are sub-
stantial; there are no agreed definitions for climate investment 
and climate finance� Quantitative data are limited, relate to different 
concepts, and are incomplete. Accounting systems are highly imperfect. 
Estimates are available for current total climate finance, total climate 
finance provided to developing countries, public climate finance pro-
vided to developing countries, and climate finance under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as well 
as future incremental investment and incremental cost for mitigation 
measures. Climate finance relates both to adaptation and mitigation, 
while under the scope of this chapter, estimates of future investment 
needs are presented only for mitigation. [Section 16.1]
Total climate finance for mitigation and adaptation is estimated 
at 343 to 385 billion USD (2010 / 11 / 12 USD) per year using a 
mix of 2010, 2011, and 2012 data, almost evenly being invested 
in developed and developing countries (medium confidence). The 
figures reflect the total financial flow for the underlying investments, 
not the incremental investment, i. e., the portion attributed to the emis-
sion reductions. Around 95 % of reported total climate finance is for 
mitigation (medium confidence). [16.2.1.1]
The total climate finance currently flowing to developing 
countries is estimated to be between 39  to  120 billion USD 
per year using a mix of 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 data 
(2009 / 2010 / 2011 / 2012 USD) (medium confidence). This range 
covers public and private flows for mitigation and adaptation. Public 
climate finance is estimated at 35 – 49 billion USD (2011 / 2012 USD) 
(medium confidence). Most public climate finance provided to devel-
oping countries flows through bilateral and multilateral institutions, 
usually as concessional loans and grants. Climate finance under the 
UNFCCC is funding provided to developing countries by Annex II Par-
ties. The climate finance reported by Annex II Parties averaged nearly 
10 billion USD per year from 2005 to 2010 (2005 – 2010 USD) (medium 
confidence). Between 2010 and 2012, the ‘fast-start finance’ (FSF) pro-
vided by some developed countries amounted to over 10 billion USD 
per year (2010 / 2011 / 2012 USD) (medium confidence). Estimates of 
international private climate finance flowing to developing countries 
range from 10 to 72 billion USD (2009 / 2010 USD) per year, including 
foreign direct investment as equity and loans in the range of 10 to 
37 billion USD (2010 USD and 2008 USD) per year over the period of 
2008 – 2011 (medium confidence). [16.2.1.1]
Emission patterns that limit temperature increase from pre-
industrial level to no more than 2 °C require considerably differ-
ent patterns of investment� A limited number of studies have exam-
ined the investment needs to transform the economy to limit warming 
to 2 °C. Information is largely restricted to energy use with global total 
annual investment in the energy sector at about 1200 billion USD. In 
the results for these scenarios, which are consistent to keeping carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO2eq) concentration in the interval 430 – 530 ppm 
until 2100, annual investment in fossil-fired power plants without car-
bon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) would decline by 30 (median: 
– 20 % compared to 2010) (2  to  166) billion USD during the period 
2010 – 2029, compared to the reference scenarios (limited evidence, 
medium agreement). Investment in low-emissions generation tech-
nologies (renewable, nuclear, and electricity generation with CCS) 
would increase by 147 (median: +100 % compared to 2010) (31 to 
360) billion USD per year during the same period (limited evidence, 
medium agreement) in combination with an increase by 336 (1 to 641) 
billion USD in energy-efficiency investments in the building, trans-
port, and industry sector (limited evidence, medium agreement), fre-
quently involving modernization of existing equipment. Higher energy 
efficiency and the shift to low-emission energy sources contribute to 
a reduction in the demand for fossil fuels, thus causing a decline in 
investment in fossil fuel extraction, transformation, and transportation. 
Scenarios suggest that the average annual reduction of investment in 
fossil fuel extraction in 2010 – 2029 would be 116 (– 8 to 369) billion 
USD (limited evidence, medium agreement). Such ‘spillover’ effects 
could yield adverse effects on economies, especially of countries that 
rely heavily on exports of fossil fuels. Model results suggest that defor-
estation could be reduced against current deforestation trends by 50 % 
with an investment of 21 to 35 billion USD per year (low confidence). 
Information on investment needs in other sectors in addition to energy 
efficiency, e. g., to abate process or non-CO2 emissions is virtually 
unavailable. [16.2.2]
Resources to address climate change need to be scaled up con-
siderably over the next few decades both in developed and 
developing countries (medium evidence, high agreement). Increased 
financial support by developed countries for mitigation (and adapta-
tion) measures in developing countries will be needed to stimulate the 
increased investment. Developed countries have committed to a goal 
of jointly mobilizing 100 billion USD per year by 2020 in the context 
of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation. 
The funding could come from a variety of sources — public and private, 
bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. 
Studies of how 100 billion USD per year could be mobilized by 2020 
conclude that it is challenging but feasible. [16.2]
Public revenues can be raised by collecting carbon taxes and 
by auctioning carbon allowances (high confidence). Putting a 
price on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, through a carbon tax or 
emissions trading, alters the rate of return on high- and low-carbon 
investments. It makes low-emission technologies attract more invest-
ment and at the same time it raises a considerable amount of revenue 
that can be used for a variety of purposes, including climate finance. 
These carbon-related sources are already sizeable in some countries 
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[16.2.1.2]. The consideration of alternative sources of public revenue 
like taxes on international bunker fuels has the potential to generate 
significant funds but is still in its infancy. Reducing fossil fuel subsi-
dies would lower emissions and release public funds for other pur-
poses [16.2.3].
Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sec-
tor, along with the public sector, can play an important role in 
financing mitigation (medium evidence, high agreement). Its con-
tribution is estimated at 267 billion USD per year in 2010 and 2011 
(2010 / 2011 USD) and at 224 billion USD (2011 / 2012 USD) per year 
in 2011 and 2012 on average, which represents around 74 % and 
62 % of overall climate finance, respectively (limited evidence, medium 
agreement) [16.2.1]. In a range of countries, a large share of private 
sector climate investment relies on low-interest and long-term loans 
as well as risk guarantees provided by public sector institutions to 
cover the incremental costs and risks of many mitigation investments. 
In many countries, therefore, the role of the public sector is crucial in 
helping these private investments happen. The quality of a country’s 
enabling environment — including the effectiveness of its institutions, 
regulations and guidelines regarding the private sector, security of 
property rights, credibility of policies and other factors — has a sub-
stantial impact on whether private firms invest in new technologies 
and infrastructures. Those same broader factors will probably have a 
big impact on whether and where investment occurs in response to 
mitigation policies [16.3]. By the end of 2012, the 20 largest emitting 
developed and developing countries with lower risk country grades 
for private sector investments covered 70 % of global energy-related 
CO2 emissions (low confidence). This makes them attractive for inter-
national private sector investment in low-carbon technologies. In many 
other countries, including most least developed countries, low-carbon 
investment will often have to rely mainly on domestic sources or inter-
national public finance [16.4.2].
A main barrier to the deployment of low-carbon technolo-
gies is a low risk-adjusted rate of return on investment vis-
à-vis high-carbon alternatives often resulting in higher cost 
of capital (medium evidence, high agreement). This is true in both 
developed and developing countries. Dedicated financial instruments 
to address these barriers exist and include inter alia credit insurance 
to decrease risk, renewable energy premiums to increase return, and 
concessional finance to decrease the cost of capital. Governments can 
also alter the relative rates of return of low-carbon investments in 
different ways and help to provide an enabling environment. [16.3, 
16.4]
Appropriate governance and institutional arrangements at the 
national, regional, and international level need to be in place 
for efficient, effective, and sustainable financing of mitigation 
measures (high confidence). They are essential to ensure that financ-
ing to mitigate and adapt to climate change responds to national 
needs and priorities and that national and international activities are 
linked and do not contradict each other. An enabling environment at 
the national level ensures efficient implementation of funds and risk 
reduction using international resources, national funds, as well as 
national development and financial institutions. [16.5]
Important synergies and tradeoffs between financing mitiga-
tion and adaptation exist (medium confidence). Available estimates 
show that adaptation projects get only a minor fraction of interna-
tional climate finance. Current analyses do not provide conclusive 
results on the most efficient temporal distribution of funding on adap-
tation vis-à-vis mitigation. While the uncertainties about specific path-
ways and relationships remain, and although there are different con-
siderations on its optimal balance, there is a general agreement that 
funding for both mitigation and adaptation is needed. Moreover, there 
is an increasing interest in promoting integrated financing approaches, 
addressing both adaptation and mitigation activities in different sec-
tors and at different levels. [16.6]
Increasing access to modern energy services for meeting basic 
cooking and lighting needs could yield substantial improve-
ments in human welfare at relatively low cost (medium confi-
dence). Shifting the large populations that rely on traditional solid fuels 
(such as unprocessed biomass, charcoal, and coal) to modern energy 
systems and expanding electricity supply for basic human needs could 
yield substantial improvements in human welfare for a relatively low 
cost; 72 – 95 billion USD per year until 2030 to achieve nearly universal 
access. [16.8]
16.1 Introduction 
This is the first time an assessment report by the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) contains a chapter dedicated to 
investment and finance to address climate change. This reflects the 
growing awareness of the relevance of these issues for the design of 
efficient and effective climate policies. 
The assessment of this topic is complicated by the absence of agreed 
definitions, sparse data from disparate sources, and limited peer-
reviewed literature. Equity, burden sharing, and gender consider-
ations related to climate change are discussed in other chapters, inter 
alia Sections 3.3 and 4.6.2. This chapter does not include a separate 
discussion of these considerations in relation to climate finance.
There is no agreed definition of climate finance (Haites, 2011; Stadel-
mann et al., 2011b; Buchner et al., 2011; Forstater and Rank, 2012). 
The term ‘climate finance’ is applied both to the financial resources 
devoted to addressing climate change globally and to financial flows 
to developing countries to assist them in addressing climate change. 
The literature includes multiple concepts within each of these broad 
categories (Box 1.1). The specific mitigation and adaptation measures 
whose costs qualify as ‘climate finance’ also are not agreed. The mea-
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Box 16�1 | Different concepts, different numbers
Different concepts of climate finance are found in the literature. 
The corresponding values differ significantly. 
Financial resources devoted to addressing climate change 
globally:
Total climate finance includes all financial flows whose expected 
effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and / or to enhance resilience 
to the impacts of climate variability and the projected climate 
change. This covers private and public funds, domestic and inter-
national flows, expenditures for mitigation and adaptation to cur-
rent climate variability as well as future climate change. It covers 
the full value of the financial flow rather than the share associated 
with the climate change benefit; e. g., the entire investment in a 
wind turbine rather than the portion attributed to the emission 
reductions. The estimate by Buchner et al. (2012, 2013b) of current 
climate finance of 343 to 385 billion USD (2010 / 2011 / 2012 USD) 
per year using a mix of 2010, 2011, and 2012 data, corresponds 
roughly to this concept. 
The incremental investment is the extra capital required for 
the initial investment for a mitigation or adaptation project in 
comparison to a reference project. For example, the investment in 
wind turbines less the investment that would have been required 
for the coal or natural gas-generating unit displaced. Since the 
value depends on the unknown investment in a hypothetical 
alternative, the incremental investment is uncertain. Incremen-
tal investment for mitigation and adaptation measures is not 
regularly estimated and reported, but estimates are available 
from models. It can be positive or negative. Many agriculture and 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+) mitigation options that involve ongoing expenditures 
for labour and other operating costs rather than investments are 
excluded.
The incremental costs reflect the cost of capital of the incremental 
investment and the change of operating and maintenance costs 
for a mitigation or adaptation project in comparison to a reference 
project. It can be calculated as the difference of the net present 
values of the two projects. Many mitigation measures — such as 
energy efficiency, renewables, and nuclear — have a higher capi-
tal cost and lower operating costs than the measures displaced. 
Frequently the incremental costs are lower than the incremental 
investment. Values depend on the incremental investment as well 
as projected operating costs, including fossil fuel prices, and the 
discount rate. Models can estimate the incremental costs of energy 
supply and demand but data are not immediately available and 
aggregate estimates cannot be provided. Estimates are available 
for single-mitigation options (see, e. g., Chapter 7).
The macroeconomic costs of mitigation policy are the reductions 
of aggregate consumption or gross domestic product induced by 
the reallocation of investments and expenditures induced by cli-
mate policy. These costs do not account for the benefit of reduc-
ing anthropogenic climate change and should thus be assessed 
against the economic benefit of avoided climate change impacts. 
Models have traditionally provided estimates of the macroeco-
nomic costs of climate policy (see Chapter 6).
Financial flows to developing countries to assist them in 
addressing climate change:
The total climate finance flowing to developing countries is the 
amount of the total climate finance invested in developing coun-
tries that comes from developed countries. This covers private and 
public funds for mitigation and adaptation. Estimates from a few 
studies suggest the current flow is between 39 and 120 billion USD 
per year (2009 – 2012 USD).
Public climate finance provided to developing countries is the 
finance provided by developed countries’ governments and bilat-
eral institutions as well as multilateral institutions for mitigation 
and adaptation activities in developing countries. Most of the 
funds provided are concessional loans and grants. Estimates sug-
gest that public climate finance flows to developing countries were 
at 35 to 49 billion USD per year in 2011 and 2012 (2011 / 2012 
USD).
Private climate finance flowing to developing countries is finance 
and investment by private actors in / from developed countries 
for activities in developing countries whose expected effect is to 
reduce net GHG emissions and / or to enhance resilience to the 
impacts of climate variability and the projected climate change.
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), climate finance is not well-defined. Annex  II 
Parties provide and mobilize funding for climate related activities 
in developing countries. Most of the funds provided are conces-
sional loans and grants. The climate finance provided to devel-
oping countries reported by Annex  II Parties averaged nearly 10 
billion USD per year from 2005 to 2010 (2005 – 2010 USD). In addi-
tion, some developed countries promised FSF amounting to over 
10 billion USD per year between 2010 and 2012 (2010 / 2011 / 2012 
USD).
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sures included vary across studies and often are determined by the 
data available1.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 16.2 reviews 
estimates of current climate finance corresponding to the different 
concepts in Box 1, projections of global incremental investment and 
incremental costs for energy-related mitigation measures to 2030, 
and options for raising public funds for climate finance. Enabling fac-
tors that influence the ability to efficiently generate and implement 
climate finance are discussed in Section 16.3. Section 16.4 considers 
opportunities and key drivers for low-carbon investments. Institutional 
arrangements for mitigation finance are addressed in Section 16.5. 
Synergies and tradeoffs between financing mitigation and adapta-
tion are discussed in Section 16.6. The chapter concludes with sections 
devoted to financing mitigation activities in developed (Section 16.7) 
and developing countries (Section  16.8) and a review of important 
gaps of knowledge (Section 16.9).
1 Most of the financial flow data in this chapter originate from 2010, 2011, and 2012 
and were published in USD. The exchange rates used by each source to convert 
other currencies to USD are not specified in the published sources. In these cases, 
the published USD figure has been maintained and the base year is similar to the 
year the commitment / investment / flow was announced / reported. If no base year is 
indicated, as for most monetary values in Section 16.2.2, the base year is 2010.
16.2 Scale of financing at 
national, regional, and 
international level in the 
short-, mid-, and long-term 
16�2�1 Current financial flows and sources
Figure 16.1 provides an overview of climate finance and the terms 
used in this chapter. The term ‘capital’ is used because most climate 
finance involves an investment, but it should be understood to include 
all relevant financial flows2. One or more capital managers mobilize 
the required capital and invest it in an adaptation or mitigation proj-
ect. Project owners or sponsors — governments, corporations, or 
households — implement a project using their own and other sources 
of capital. However, projects often obtain capital from multiple capital 
managers (Buchner et al., 2011, 2012; Jürgens et al., 2012). An instru-
ment defines the financial agreement between a project owner / spon-
sor and a manager of capital. A project that obtains capital from sev-
2 Terms that cover both capital and operating costs, such as ‘financial resources’ or 
‘funds’ are cumbersome (sources / managers of financial resources) or potentially 
confusing (‘funds’ can also be institutions).
Figure 16�1 | Overview of climate finance flows. Note: Capital should be understood to include all relevant financial flows. The size of the boxes is not related to the magnitude of 
the financial flow.
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eral managers would use multiple instruments. The size of the boxes is 
not related to the magnitude of the financial flow.
Data on current climate finance, summarized below, indicate that most 
capital deployed is private — private corporations and households. That 
is not surprising since they dominate the economy in most countries.
Domestically, government funds are disbursed directly as financial 
incentives or tax credits, or through national financial institutions. 
Climate finance under the UNFCCC currently is provided mainly by 
the national governments of Annex  II Parties. Climate finance from 
the budgets of these government flows through bilateral institutions 
being a national public entity, such as Japan International Coopera-
tion Agency (JICA), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Kredi-
tanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), or through multilateral institutions 
having several countries as shareholders, such as the World Bank, 
regional development banks, and multilateral climate funds.
There is no internationally agreed definition of mitigation and adapta-
tion projects; for example, whether a high-efficiency gas-fired gener-
ating unit is a mitigation project or which capacity building activities 
help to address climate change. The relevant projects, and hence the 
scale of climate finance, depend upon the definition of mitigation and 
adaptation projects adopted. In practice, the definition varies across 
studies and is often determined by the data available.
16�2�1�1 Estimates of current climate finance
This section reviews estimates of current global total climate finance, 
total climate finance flowing to developing countries, public climate 
finance provided to developing countries and climate finance under 
the UNFCCC.
There is no comprehensive system for tracking climate finance (Clapp 
et al., 2012; Tirpak et al., 2012), therefore, estimates must be compiled 
from disparate sources of variable quality and timeliness, sources that 
use different assumptions and methodologies and have gaps and 
may occasionally duplicate coverage. Available data typically relate to 
commitments rather than disbursements, so the amount reported may 
not equal the amount received by the project owner during a given 
year. Changes in exchange rates further complicate the picture. For 
these and other reasons, estimates of current climate finance exhibit 
considerable uncertainties.
Global total climate finance is estimated at 343 to 385 billion 
USD per year for 2010 / 11 (2010 / 11 USD) and 356 to 363 billion USD 
per year for 2011 / 12 (2011 / 12 USD), with mitigation accounting for 
approximately 95 % of this amount (350 billion USD and 337 billion 
USD, respectively) (Buchner et al., 2012, 2013b). This estimate includes 
a mix of instruments, e. g., grants, concessional loans, commercial 
loans and equity, as well as the full investment in mitigation measures 
such as renewable energy generation technologies that also produce 
other goods or services3. The figures reflect new commitments by capi-
tal managers using a mix of 2010 / 11 and 2011 / 12 data, respectively. 
Private finance dominates the total, but its share declined from 74 % 
(267 billion USD) on average in 2010 and 2011 to 62 % (224 billion 
USD) on average in 2011 and 2012 (2010 / 2011 USD and 2011 / 2012 
USD) (Buchner et  al., 2012, 2013b). Investment in renewable gen-
eration technologies dominates the mitigation investment (Frankfurt 
School-UNEP Centre and BNEF, 2012).
Reasonably robust estimates of total climate finance for individual 
countries are available for only a few cases, for instance, for Germany 
(Jürgens et al., 2012). However, some institutions report on their financ-
ing commitments for climate and environment. Data from 19 develop-
ment banks indicate that commitments of mitigation finance increased 
from 51 billion USD in 2011 to 65 billion USD in 2012 with commit-
ments of adaptation finance rising from 6 to 14 billion USD over the 
same period (2011 / 2012 USD). Concessional funding provided by pub-
lic development banks plays an important role in financing domestic 
climate projects, e. g., in Brazil, China, and Germany.
A growing number of developed and developing countries, including 
Bangladesh, Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal, Samoa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and the United States as well as the European Commission, calculates 
the share of their annual budget devoted to climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation often using a methodology known as a Climate 
Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (UNDP, 2013a). Country 
estimates range from 3 – 15 % of the national budget. 
A few estimates of total climate finance flowing to developing coun-
tries are available. Clapp et  al. (2012) estimate the total at 70 – 120 
billion USD per year based on 2009 – 2010 data (2009 / 2010 USD). Data 
from Buchner et al. (2013a) suggest a net flow to developing countries 
of the order of 40 to 60 billion USD for 2010 and 2011 (2010 / 2011 
USD).4 For 2011 and 2012, North-South flows are estimated at 39 
to 62 billion USD (2011 / 2012 USD) (Buchner et  al., 2013b). Clapp 
et  al. (2012) estimate the private investment at 37 – 72 billion USD 
(2009 / 2010 USD) per year based on 2009 – 2010 data and Stadelmann 
3 Methodology used by Buchner et al. (2012, 2013b): Finance flows are limited to 
‘climate-specific finance’, capital flows targeting low-carbon, and climate-resilient 
development with direct or indirect mitigation or adaptation objectives / outcomes. 
The focus is on current financial flows (upfront capital investment costs and grants 
expressed as commitments, so risk management instruments are excluded). Data 
are for total rather than incremental investment because incremental investment 
requires assumptions on the baseline on a project-by-project basis. The data are 
for ‘gross’ investment, the full value of the investment, and reflect commitments 
because disbursement data is not widely available. The data are a mix of 2010 
and 2011 data, and 2011 and 2012 data, respectively.
4 Buchner et al. (2013) estimate that developed countries mobilized 213 to 255 bil-
lion USD climate finance per year during 2010 and 2011 while 160 to 208 billion 
USD climate finance had been committed to climate change projects in developed 
countries. Developing countries mobilized 120 to 141 billion USD climate finance 
per year during 2010 and 2011 and 162 to 202 billion USD had been commit-
ted to climate change projects in developing countries. Those figures suggest a 
net flow to developing countries of the order of 40 to 60 billion USD per year 
(2010 / 2011 USD).
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et al. (2013) estimate foreign direct investment as equity and loans in 
the range of 10 to 37 billion USD per year based on 2008 – 2011 data 
(2010 USD and 2008 USD). 
The investment in registered Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) projects is estimated at over 400 billion USD over the period 
2004 to 2012 (2004 – 2012 USD) (UNEP Risø, 2013). Of that amount 
almost 80 billion USD was for projects registered during 2011 and 
195 billion USD for projects registered during 2012 (2011 USD and 
2012 USD). The majority of the investment in CDM projects is private. 
Renewable energy projects account for over 70 % of the total invest-
ment. The share of CDM renewable energy projects with some foreign 
investment has grown over time, representing almost 25 billion USD in 
2011 (2011 USD) (Kirkman et al., 2013).5 
Since 1999 almost 100 carbon funds with a capitalization of 14.2 
billion USD have been established (Alberola and Stephan, 2010).6 
Carbon funds are investment vehicles that raise capital to purchase 
carbon credits (52 %) and / or invest in emission reduction projects 
(23 %). A fund may have only private investors (48 %), only public 
investors (29 %) or a mix of both (23 %) (Alberola and Stephan, 2010). 
Investment may be restricted to a specific region or project type (e. g., 
REDD+). Financial data, especially for private funds, is often confiden-
tial so the amount of finance provided to developing countries via 
carbon funds is not available. Scaling up data from 29 funds on the 
amount invested in projects suggests a maximum cumulative invest-
ment of 18 billion USD (1999 – 2009 USD) (Kirkman et al., 2013). 
Public climate finance provided to developing countries was esti-
mated at 35 to 49 billion USD per year in 2011 and 2012 (2011 / 2012 
USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).7 These public funds flow mainly through 
bilateral and multilateral institutions8. Most of the climate finance is 
implemented by development banks, frequently involving the blend-
ing of government resources with their own funds. There are two main 
reporting systems for public support in place that are not fully compa-
rable due to differences in respective methodologies.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reports the amount of offi-
cial development assistance (ODA) committed bilaterally for projects 
5 CDM projects sell emission reduction credits, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), 
to developed country buyers, which provide a return to developed country inves-
tors. 
6 United Nations Environment Program (UNDP) estimates that in addition up to 
6000 private equity funds have been established for the purpose of funding 
climate change-related activities (UNDP, 2011).
7 Buchner et al. (2013b) count climate finance provided by bilateral finance institu-
tions, multilateral finance institutions, government bodies, and climate funds as 
public flows. The difference between lower- and upper-bound results when taking 
the ownership structure of multilateral institutions into account and excluding all 
bilateral flows marked as having climate as ‘significant’ objective.
8 Ryan et al. (2012) estimate the annual average finance provided to developing 
countries for energy efficiency at 18.9 billion USD in 2010 from bilateral financial 
institutions and 4.9 billion USD from multilateral financial institutions over the 
period 2008 – 2011.
that have climate change mitigation or adaptation as a ‘principal’ or 
‘significant’ objective by its 23 member countries and the European 
Commission. The DAC defines ODA as those flows to countries on the 
DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions provided 
by official agencies or by their executive agencies. Resources must be 
used to promote the economic development and welfare of develop-
ing countries as a main objective and they must be concessional in 
character, meaning as grants or as concessional loans including a grant 
element of at least 25 %, calculated at a rate of discount of 10 %. The 
amount is the total funding committed to each project, not the share 
of the project costs attributable to climate change (OECD, 2013a). 
Researchers have questioned the accuracy of the project classification 
(Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011; Junghans and Harmeling, 2013). 
Bilateral commitments averaged 20 billion USD per year in 2010 and 
2011 (2010 / 2011 USD) (OECD, 2013a) and were implemented by 
bilateral development banks or other bilateral agencies, provided to 
national government directly or to dedicated multilateral climate funds 
(Buchner et al., 2012, 2013b).
Seven multilateral development banks (MDBs)9 reported climate 
finance commitments of about 24.1 and 26.8 billion USD in 2011 and 
2012, respectively (2011 / 2012 USD). The reporting is activity-based 
allowing counting entire projects but also project components. Recipi-
ent countries include developing countries and 13 European Union 
(EU) member states. It covers grant, loan, guarantee, equity, and per-
formance-based instruments, not requiring a specific grant element. 
The volume covers MDBs’ own resources as well as external resources 
managed by the MDBs that are also reported to OECD DAC (such as 
contributions to the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Climate Invest-
ment Funds (CIFs), and Carbon Funds) (AfDB et al., 2012a; b, 2013).
Under the UNFCCC, climate finance is not well-defined. Annex  II 
Parties committed to provide new and additional financial resources 
to cover the “agreed full incremental costs” of agreed mitigation mea-
sures implemented by developing countries (Article 4.3), to “assist 
the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation” 
(Article 4.4) and to cover the agreed full costs incurred by developing 
countries for the preparation of their national communications (Article 
4.3) (UNFCCC, 1992). None of these terms are operationally defined 
(Machado-Filho, 2011). These commitments are reaffirmed by the Kyoto 
Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998, Art. 11). The Conference of Parties (COP) has 
agreed that funds provided to developing country Parties may come 
from a wide variety of sources, public, and private, bilateral and multi-
lateral, including alternative sources (UNFCCC, 2010, para. 99).
Annex II Parties report the financial resources they provide to develop-
ing countries through bilateral and multilateral channels for climate 
9 African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB) and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
1216
Cross-cutting Investment and Finance Issues
16
Chapter 16
change action to increase transparency about public flows of climate 
finance vis-à-vis expectations and needs. The latest summary of the 
Annex II reports on their provided climate finance indicates that they 
provided a total of 58.4 billion USD for the period 2005 through 
2010, an average of nearly 10 billion USD per year (2005 – 2010 USD) 
(UNFCCC, 2011a).10 Most of the funds provided are concessional loans 
and grants. In addition, a range of developed countries promised FSF 
of about 10 billion USD per year from 2010 to 2012 (2010 / 2011 / 2012 
USD) (see Section 16.2.1.3).11
Operating entities of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC deal 
with less than 10 % of the climate finance reported under the Conven-
tion, although that could change once the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
becomes operational. Annex II Party contributions to the Trust Fund of 
the GEF, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Devel-
oped Countries Fund (LDCF) amounted to about 3.3  billion USD for 
2005 through 2010, an average of less than 0.6 billion USD per year 
(2005 – 2010 USD) (UNFCCC, 2011a). Most of the funds are used for 
mitigation. The Adaptation Fund derives most of its funds from the sale 
of its share of the CERs issued for CDM projects12.
16�2�1�2 Current sources of climate finance 
Climate finance comes from the sources of capital shown in Figure 
16.1 including capital markets, carbon markets, and government bud-
gets. Most government funding comes from general revenue but some 
governments also raise revenue from sources — carbon taxes and auc-
tioned GHG-emission allowances — that have mitigation benefits. Most 
corporate funding comes from corporate cash flow including corporate 
borrowing, often called balance-sheet finance (Frankfurt School-UNEP 
Centre, 2013).13 Household funding comes from household income from 
wages, investments, and other sources. Governments, corporations, and 
households can all access capital markets to mobilize additional funds. 
10 Although there is an agreed reporting format, the UNFCCC Secretariat notes 
that many data gaps and inconsistencies persist in the reporting approaches of 
Annex II Parties. The information is compiled by the UNFCCC Secretariat from 
Annex II national communications. The figures represent ‘as committed’ or ‘as 
spent’ currency over the 6 years. The procedures used by different countries and 
the Secretariat to convert currencies into USD are not known.
11 Although COP took note of the ´fast start finance’ (FSF) commitment in paragraph 
95 of Decision 1 / CP.16 (UNFCCC, 2010) and the funds committed have been 
reported annually to the UNFCCC, the FSF is not formally climate finance under 
the UNFCCC.
12 Currently the only international levy is the 2 % of the CERs issued for most CDM 
projects provided to the Adaptation Fund. The Fund sells the CERs and uses the 
proceeds for adaptation projects in developing countries. Sale of CERs gener-
ated revenue of over 90 million USD for FY 2010 (2010 / 2011 USD) and over 50 
million USD for FY 2011 (World Bank, 2012a). In December 2012 Parties agreed 
to extend the share of proceeds levy to the issuance of emission reduction unit 
(ERUs) and the first international transfers of AAUs (UNFCCC, 2012a, para. 21).
13 General revenue includes revenue collected from all taxes and charges imposed 
by a government. Balance sheet finance means that a new investment is financed 
by the firm rather than as a separate project. The firm may seek external funding 
(debt and / or equity) but that funding is secured by the operations of the firm 
rather than the new investment.
This section summarizes estimates of the revenue currently generated 
by carbon taxes and auctioned GHG-emission allowances. Fuel taxes, 
fossil fuel royalties, and electricity charges can be converted to CO2eq 
charges but they are excluded here because they are usually imple-
mented for different policy goals.
Carbon taxes generate about 7 billion USD in revenue annually 
mainly in European countries (2010 / 2011 USD).14 Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, and the United Kingdom — generated about 6.8 billion USD in 
2010 (2010 USD) and 7.3 billion USD (2011 USD) in 2011. India15, Aus-
tralia, and Japan introduced carbon taxes in July 2010, July 2012, and 
October 2012, respectively. In some countries, part or all of the rev-
enue is dedicated to environmental purposes or reducing other taxes; 
none is earmarked for international climate finance.
Auctioned allowances, fixed price compliance options, and the interna-
tional sale of surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) generate about 
2 billion USD per year for national governments (2010 / 2011 USD). 
Among the 30 countries participating in the EU emissions trading 
scheme, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom auctioned some emission allowances during 
the second (2008 – 2012) phase (European Commission, 2012). Buch-
ner et  al. (2011, 2012) estimate auction revenue at 1.4 and 1.6 bil-
lion USD for 2010 and 2011 (2010 / 2011 USD). Germany has so far 
earmarked a portion of its auction revenue for international climate 
finance (Germany Federal Ministry for the Environment Nature Con-
servation and Nuclear Safety, 2012). New Zealand collected 1.25 and 
1.42 million USD for 2010 (6 months) and 2011, respectively, from its 
fixed price compliance option of 10.8 USD per tonne of CO2 (15 NZD) 
(New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2012).
Several eastern European countries (Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, 
and Russia) sell surplus AAUs to generate revenue. Others such as Bul-
garia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, sell their surplus AAUs 
to fund Green Investment Schemes that support domestic emission 
reduction measures (Linacre et al., 2011).16 Revenue rose from 276 mil-
lion USD in 2008 (2008 USD) to 2 billion USD in 2009 (2009 USD) and 
then declined to less than 1.1 billion USD in 2010 (2010 USD) (Kossoy 
and Ambrosi, 2010; Linacre et al., 2011; Tuerk et al., 2013). Buchner at 
al. (2011, 2012) estimate the revenue at 580 and 240 million USD for 
2010 and 2011, respectively (2010 and 2011 USD).
14 Revenue from taxes explicitly named carbon taxes in the OECD database of 
environmentally related taxes, available at http: / / www2. oecd. org / ecoinst / 
queries / index.htm.
15 In India, the carbon tax is on coal only.
16 The Green Investment Schemes are a source of climate finance for these countries.
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16�2�1�3 Recent developments
Climate finance has been affected by the financial crisis of late 2008, 
the subsequent stimulus packages and the FSF commitment of 30 bil-
lion USD for 2010 – 2012 made by developed countries in December 
2009 for climate action in developing countries. 
The financial crisis in late 2008 reduced investment in renewable 
energy (Hamilton and Justice, 2009). In late 2008 and early 2009, 
investment in renewable generation fell disproportionately more than 
that in other types of generating capacity (IEA, 2009). Global invest-
ment in renewable energy fell 3 % during 2009 but rebounded strongly 
in 2010 and 2011. In developed countries, where the financial crisis hit 
hardest, investment dropped 14 % while renewable energy investment 
continued to grow in developing countries (Frankfurt School-UNEP 
Centre and BNEF, 2012).
In response to the financial crisis, Group of Twenty Finance Ministers 
(G20) governments implemented economic stimulus packages 
amounting to 2.6 trillion USD. Of that amount, 180 to 242 billion USD 
was low-carbon funding (2008 and 2009 USD) (IEA, 2009; REN21, 
2010). The stimulus spending supported the rapid recovery of renewable 
energy investment by compensating for reduced financing from banks. 
Some countries facing large public sector deficits scaled down green 
spending when the economy started recovering (Eyraud et al., 2011).
At the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries committed 
to provide new and additional resources approaching 30 billion USD of 
FSF to support mitigation and adaptation action in developing countries 
during 2010 – 2012 (UNFCCC, 2009a). The sum of the announced com-
mitments exceeds 33 billion USD (UNFCCC, 2011b, 2012b; c, 2013a)17. 
Japan, United States, United Kingdom, Norway, and Germany being the 
five biggest donors have reported commitments amounting to 27 billion 
USD (2010 / 2011 / 2012 USD). Nakooda et  al. (2013) finds that around 
45 % have been provided as grants and around 47 % in the form of 
loans, guarantees, and insurance. Approximately 61 % of the funds had 
been committed for mitigation, 10 % for REDD+, ,18 % for adaptation, 
9 % for multiple objectives and for 2 % of the funding the purpose is 
unknown. The funders reported commitments to recipient country gov-
ernments via bilateral channels (33 %), multilateral climate funds (20 %), 
recipient countries companies (12 %), and multilateral institutions (9 %). 
Data on actual disbursements is not available to date because of the 
multi-year time lag between commitment and disbursement.
The announced pledges triggered questions as to whether they were 
‘new and additional’ as promised (Fallasch and De Marez, 2010; BNEF, 
2011). Some countries explain the basis on which they consider their 
pledge to be ‘new and additional’. Criteria have been proposed that 
17 The information is compiled by the UNFCCC Secretariat from national reports 
on FSF. The figures represent ‘as committed’ currency over the three years. The 
procedures used by different countries and the Secretariat to convert currencies 
into USD are not known.
indicate, when applied to the pledges, that proportions ranging from 
virtually none to almost all are new and additional (Brown et al., 2010; 
Stadelmann et al., 2010, 2011b). For Germany, Japan, the United King-
dom, and the United States annual FSF contributions were significantly 
higher than the 2009 expenditure related to climate activities in devel-
oping countries (Nakooda et al., 2013).
16�2�2 Future low-carbon investment 
As noted in Chapter 6, the stabilization of GHG concentrations will ulti-
mately require dramatic changes in the world’s energy system, includ-
ing a dramatic expansion in the deployment of low-carbon energy 
sources. This change will require significant shifts in global investment 
in the energy, land use, transportation, and infrastructure sector. The 
future investment flows summarized in this section are based on sev-
eral large-scale analyses conducted over the past few years. For the 
most part these analyses explore scenarios to achieve specified tem-
perature or concentration goals. Hence, the estimates of investment 
flows drawn from these studies should not be interpreted as forecasts, 
but rather, as some probable future states of the world. 
Figure 16.2 presents estimates of baseline, i. e., current investment 
in energy supply sub-sectors as a reference for the following consid-
erations. It illustrates the very substantial nature of investments in 
today’s energy sector with global total annual investment at about 
USD2010 1200 billion and very strong roles for investments in fossil fuel 
extraction, transmission and distribution (T&D), and electricity genera-
tion.
16�2�2�1 Investment needs
While a large number of studies and many modelling comparison 
exercises have assessed technological transformation pathways and 
the macroeconomic costs of transforming the global economy, only a 
handful of studies estimate the associated investment needs. Section 
16.2.2.2 summarizes available estimates of investment needs under 
climate policy between 2010 – 2029 and 2030 – 2049, for the world as 
a whole and for non-OECD and OECD countries. Models and scenarios 
differ so the focus is on incremental investment, i. e., the differences in 
the estimated investment between the reference and mitigation sce-
narios.18 It must also be noted that the model estimates crucially rely 
on assumptions about the future costs of technologies and of subsi-
dies, on the possibility of nuclear phaseout in some countries, and on 
the mitigation policies already included in the reference scenarios.
Without climate policy, investments in the power sector would 
mainly be directed towards fossil fuels, especially in non-OECD coun-
tries that rely on low-cost coal power plants to supply their growing 
18 Adaptation costs and economic losses from future climate change are not consid-
ered in any of these estimates.
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demand for electricity. At the global level, fossil fuel-based power 
generation would require an average annual investment of 182 (95 
to 234) billion USD in 2010 – 2029 and 287 (158 to 364) billion USD 
in 2030 – 2049;19 the bulk of investments (roughly 80 %) goes to non-
OECD countries.20 There is greater uncertainty in models about the 
future of renewable and nuclear power without climate policy. Mod-
elled global investment in renewable power generation is expected 
to increase over time from 123 (31 to 180) billion USD per year in 
2010 – 2029 to 233 (131 to 336) billion USD over 2030 – 2049. Nuclear 
power generation would attract 55 (11 to 131) billion USD annually in 
2010 – 2029 and 90 (0 to 155) billion USD per year in 2030 – 2049.
The introduction of an emission reduction target in the models 
abruptly changes the investment pattern. Figures 16.3 and 16.4 report 
the investment change for major power generation technologies, 
fossil fuel extraction, and for end-use energy efficiency, for emission 
scenarios compatible with a long-term target of keeping mean global 
temperature increase below 2 °C in 2100.21 Although the policy targets 
19 The mean should not be considered as an expected value. It is not possible to 
attribute any probability distribution to models’ outcomes. Therefore policymakers 
face pure uncertainty in face of future investment needs. The range is presented to 
provide information on the degree of uncertainty in the literature.
20 See captions of Figures 16.3 and 16.4 for a list of the studies surveyed.
21 Also in this case, the mean and median are used as synthetic indicators having no 
predictive power.
are not identical, they are close enough to allow a broad comparison 
of results. The dispersion across estimated emission reductions over 
2010 – 2029 and 2010 – 2049 is mainly due to differences in reference 
scenario emissions and because models choose different optimal emis-
sion trajectories among the many compatible with the long-term cli-
mate goal.
The results of an analysis of investment estimates in Figures 16.3 and 
16.4 show that climate policy is expected to induce a major reallo-
cation of investments in the power sector. Investments in fossil-fired 
power plants (without CCS) were equal to about 137 billion USD per 
year in 2010. Investment would decline by 30 (2 to 166) billion USD 
per year (about – 20 % for the median) during the period 2010 – 2029, 
compared to the reference scenarios. Investment in low-emissions 
generation technologies (renewable, nuclear, and electricity genera-
tion with CCS) would increase by 147 (31 to 360) billion USD per year 
(about 100 % for the median) during the same period. 
Based on a limited number of studies (McKinsey, 2009; IEA, 2011; Riahi 
et  al., 2012), annual incremental investments until 2030 in energy-
efficiency investments in the building, transport, and industry sector 
increase by 336 (1 to 641) billion USD. The only three studies with sec-
toral detail in end-use technologies show an increase of investments 
of 153 (57 to 228) billion USD for the building sector, 198 (98 to 344) 
billion USD for the transport sector, 80 (40 to 131) billion USD for the 
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industry sector. Incremental investments in end-use technologies are 
particularly hard to estimate and the number of studies is limited 
(Riahi et al., 2012). Results should therefore be taken with caution.
While models tend to agree on the relative importance of investments 
in fossil and non-fossil power generation, they differ with respect to 
the mix of low-emission power generation technologies and the over-
all incremental investment. This is mainly due to different reference 
scenarios (e. g., population, economic growth, exogenous technologi-
cal progress), and assumptions about (1) the structure of the energy 
system and the costs of reducing the energy intensity of the economy 
versus reducing the carbon intensity of energy, (2) the investment costs 
of alternative technologies over time, and (3) technological or politi-
cal constraints on technologies. Limits to the deployment of some key 
technology options or the presence of policy constraints (e. g., delayed 
action, limited geographical participation) would increase investment 
needs (Riahi et al., 2012; McCollum et al., 2013).
Higher energy efficiency, technological innovation in transport, and 
the shift to low-emission generation technologies — all contribute to 
a drastic reduction in the demand for fossil fuels, thus causing a sharp 
decline in investment in fossil fuel extraction, transformation, and 
transportation. Scenarios from a limited number of models suggest 
that average annual investment reduction in 2010 – 2029 would be 
equal to 56 (– 8 to 369) billion USD. The contraction would be sharper 
in 2030 – 2049, in the order of 451 (332 to 1385) billion USD per year. 
Figure 16�3 | Change of average annual investment in mitigation scenarios (2010 – 2029). Investment changes are calculated by a limited number of model studies and model 
comparisons for mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations within the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 compared to respective average baseline investments. Note: 
The vertical bars indicate the range between minimum and maximum estimate of investment changes; the horizontal bar indicates the median of model results. Proximity to this 
median value does not imply higher likelihood because of the different degree of aggregation of model results, low number of studies available, and different assumptions in the 
different studies considered. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of studies available in the literature. Sources: UNFCCC (2008). IEA (2011): 450 Scenario (450) 
relative to the Constant Policies Scenario (CPS). The CPS investment in CCS is also included under Coal and Gas (retrofitting); World investment in biofuels includes international 
bunkers; investment in solar photovoltaic (PV) in buildings is attributed to power plants in supply-side investment. Riahi et al. (2012): the Global Energy Assessment Mix scenario 
(GEA-Mix) relative to the GEA reference scenario. Carraro et al. (2012): 460 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (t460) relative to reference scenario. McCollum et al. (2013): the Low Climate 
Impact Scenarios and Implications of Required Tight Emission Control Strategies (LIMITS), RefPol-450 scenario (2.8 W / m2 in 2100) relative to the reference scenarios, mean of six 
models. McKinsey (2009): data obtained from Climate Desk, S2015 scenario with full technological potential, 100 % success rate, negative lever of costs, beginning of policy in 
2015 | Regions: OECD, non-OECD, and World.
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All models that provide data on investments for fossil fuel extraction 
show that overall investments in energy supply would decrease against 
the baseline trends in scenarios consistent with the 2 °C limit (IEA, 
2011; Carraro et al., 2012; Riahi et al., 2012; McCollum et al., 2013).
According to a range of models, climate policy would thus substan-
tially change the allocation of baseline energy investments rather than 
increase overall demand for energy investment. 
Models with a separate consideration of energy-efficiency measures fore-
see the need for significant incremental investment in energy efficiency 
in the building, transport, and industry sector in addition to  the realloca-
tion of investment from high-carbon to low-carbon power  supply. 
There is wide agreement among model results on the necessity to 
ramp up investments in research and development (R&D) to increase 
end-use energy efficiency and to improve low-emission generation 
energy carriers and energy transformation technologies. Estimates of 
the additional funding needed for energy-related R&D range from 
4.5 to 78 billion USD per year during 2010 – 2029 (UNFCCC, 2007; 
Carraro et  al., 2012; McCollum et  al., 2013) and from 115 to 126 
billion USD per year in 2030 – 2049 (Carraro et al., 2012; Marangoni 
and Tavoni, 2013; McCollum et al., 2013). Because of the need for 
new low-carbon alternatives, investments in R&D are higher in case 
of nuclear phaseout and other technological constraints (Bosetti 
et al., 2011).
Figure 16�4 | Change of average annual investment in mitigation scenarios (2030 – 2049). Investment changes are calculated by a limited number of model studies and model 
comparisons for mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations within the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 compared to respective average baseline investments. Note: 
The vertical bars indicate the range between minimum and maximum estimate of investment changes; the horizontal bar indicates the median of model results. Proximity to this 
median value does not imply higher likelihood because of the different degree of aggregation of model results, low number of studies available, and different assumptions in the 
different studies considered. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of studies available in the literature. Sources: Riahi et al. (2012): the Global Energy Assessment 
Mix scenario (GEA-Mix) relative to the GEA reference scenario. Carraro et al. (2012): 460 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (t460) relative to reference scenario. McCollum et al. (2013): the Low 
Climate Impact Scenarios and Implications of Required Tight Emission Control Strategies (LIMITS), RefPol-450 scenario (2.8 W / m2 in 2100) relative to the reference scenarios, mean 
of six models. Regions: OECD, non-OECD, and World.
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Land-use is the second largest source of GHG emissions and within 
land use, tropical deforestation is by far the largest source (see Chap-
ters 5 and 11). Efforts to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of GHGs 
will require investments in land use change (LUC) as well as in the 
energy sector.
Kindermann et al. (2008) use three global forestry and land use models 
to examine the costs of reduced emissions through avoided deforesta-
tion over the 25 year period from 2005 – 2030.22 The models’ results 
suggest substantial emission reductions can be achieved. The mod-
els estimate that 1.6 to 4.3 GtCO2 per year could be reduced for 20 
USD tCO2 with the greatest reductions coming from Africa followed 
by Central and South America and Southeast Asia. They also use the 
models to estimate the costs to reduce deforestation by between 10 % 
and 50 % of the baseline. Deforestation could be reduced by 10 % 
(0.3 – 0.6 GtCO2 per year) over the 25-year period for an investment 
of 0.5 to 2.1 billion USD per year in forest preservation activities, and 
a 50 % reduction (1.5 – 2.7 GtCO2 per year) could be achieved for an 
investment of 21.2 to 34.9 billion USD per year. This is comparable to 
what has been found by UNFCCC (2008) and McCollum et al. (2013).
Investment needs in other sectors commonly relate to energy-effi-
ciency measures included above. Information on global or regional 
investment needs to abate process emissions or non-CO2 emissions in 
sectors like the waste, petroleum, gas, cement, or the chemical industry 
is virtually unavailable. For instance, McKinsey (2009) does not pro-
vide information that could be separated from energy-efficiency mea-
sures in the sectors. An indicative estimate for the waste sector can 
be derived from Pfaff-Simoneit (2012) suggesting investment needs of 
approximately 10 – 20 billon USD per year if access to a modern waste 
management system were to be provided for an additional 100 million 
people per year.
16�2�2�2 Incremental costs
Incremental costs can be calculated for an individual project, a pro-
gramme, a sector, a country, or the world as a whole. The incremental 
costs reflect the incremental investment and the change of operating 
and maintenance costs for a mitigation or adaptation project in com-
parison to a reference project. It can be calculated as the difference of 
the net present values of the two projects. Estimates of the incremen-
tal costs of mitigation measures for key sectors or the entire economy 
have been prepared for over 20 developing countries (Olbrisch et al., 
2011). When estimates of both the incremental costs and the incre-
mental investment are available, the former is generally lower because 
of the annualization of incremental investments for the calculation of 
incremental costs.
22 The models used are the Dynamic Integrated Model of Forestry and Alternative 
Land Use (DIMA) (Roktiyanskiy et al., 2007), the Generalized Comprehensive 
Mitigation Assessment Process Model (GCOMAP) (Sathaye et al., 2006), and the 
Global Timber Model (GTM) (Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 2003).
From an economic perspective, macroeconomic incremental costs can 
be defined as the lost gross domestic product (GDP). This measure 
provides an aggregate cost of the mitigation actions (estimates pro-
vided in Chapter 6), but it does not provide information on the specific 
micro-economic investments that must be made and costs incurred to 
meet the mitigation commitments. This distinction is important if inter-
national climate finance commitments will be implemented through 
institutions designed to provide financial support for specific invest-
ments and costs rather than macro-level compensation.
Other than on the project-level, investment needs are thus frequently 
only a fraction of incremental costs on the level of the macro-economy. 
This difference is largely due to reduced growth of carbon-constrained 
economies in many models. Adaptation costs and economic losses 
from future climate change, which are not considered in these esti-
mates, should be lower for climate policy scenarios than in the refer-
ence scenario. 
16�2�3 Raising public funding by developed 
countries for climate finance in 
developing countries
Comparison of the model estimates of future mitigation investment 
(Section 16.2.2) with the current level of global total climate finance 
(Section 16.2.1.1) indicates that global climate finance needs to be 
scaled up. Increased financial support by developed countries for 
mitigation (and adaptation) in developing countries will be needed 
to stimulate the increased investment. This section reviews possible 
sources of additional funds that could be implemented by developed 
country governments to finance mitigation in developing countries. 
In December 2009, developed countries committed to a goal of mobi-
lizing jointly 100 billion USD a year by 2020 to address the needs of 
developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions 
and transparency on implementation. This funding will come from a 
wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, 
including alternative sources of finance (UNFCCC, 2009a).23 This goal 
has been recognized by the COP (UNFCCC, 2010, para. 98). This rec-
ognition does not change the commitments of Annex II Parties speci-
fied in Article 4 of the Convention to provide financial resources for 
climate-related costs incurred by developing countries.
Studies by the High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financ-
ing (AGF) (AGF, 2010) and the World Bank Group et al. (2011) at the 
request of G20 finance ministers have analyzed options for mobilizing 
100 billion USD per year by 2020. The AGF concluded that it is chal-
lenging but feasible to reach the goal of mobilizing 100 billion USD 
23 There is currently no definition of which ‘climate’ activities count toward the 100 
billion USD, what ‘mobilizing’ means, or even which countries are covered by this 
commitment (Caruso and Ellis, 2013).
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annually for climate actions in developing countries. Both reports con-
clude that a mix of sources is likely to be required to reach the goal.
Both reports estimate the revenue that could be mobilized in 2020 by 
various options to finance climate action in developing countries in the 
context of a carbon price of 25 USD per tonne of CO2eq in Annex  II 
countries. The feasibility of the options was not assessed. For some 
options, only a fraction of the revenue was assumed to be available for 
international climate finance. Their estimates of the international cli-
mate finance that could be generated by each option, together with 
other estimates, where available, are summarized in Table 16.1. Only 
options to mobilize public funds and that yield mitigation benefits are 
included in the table; options for increased borrowing by multilateral 
institutions and mobilizing more private finance are excluded.
Virtually all of the options put a price on GHG emissions thus providing 
a mitigation benefit in addition to generating revenue. The options are 
grouped into the following categories (Haites and Mwape, 2013): 
1. Options that contribute to developed countries national budgets, 
dependent on national decisions;
2. Options that contribute to national budgets, dependent on interna-
tional agreements; and
3. Funds collected internationally pursuant to an international agree-
ment. 
Funds mobilized by options in the first two categories flow into 
national budgets, so the amount allocated for international climate 
finance depends on national decisions. In contrast, funds mobilized by 
options in the third category go directly to an international fund.
The AGF and G20 reports assume for many options that only small 
fraction of the total revenue mobilized is dedicated to international 
climate finance. Hence, these options would mobilize revenue to meet 
the international climate finance goal and at the same time mobilize 
substantial revenue for domestic use by Annex  II governments. The 
domestic share of the revenue could be used by Annex II treasuries to 
reduce deficits and debt, or to reduce existing distortionary taxes and 
so help stimulate economic growth. 
Global modelling estimates
Using integrated models, it is possible to estimate the potential car-
bon revenues when all emissions are taxed or all permits are auc-
tioned. These estimates reflect a scenario in which all world regions 
commit to reduce GHG emissions using an efficient allocation of 
abatement effort, i. e., globally equal marginal abatement costs. 
Therefore, it should be used to gain insights rather than exact rev-
enue forecasts.
From the analysis of scenarios already presented in this chapter (Car-
raro et al., 2012; Calvin et al., 2012; McCollum et al., 2013) it is pos-
sible to derive the following messages:
Carbon revenues are potentially large, in the order of up to 200 billion 
USD each in China, the European Union and the United States in 2030. 
At the global level, they could top 1600 billion USD in 2030.
Table 16�1 | Summary of potential sources of public funds for climate finance in 2020.
Option Projected amount generated in 2020 (billion USD2010 / year) Share assumed to be dedicated to international climate finance
1) Options that contribute to developed country national budgets, dependent on national decisions
Domestic auctioned allowances AGF: 125 – 250b; G20: 250 AGF: 2 – 10 %; G20: 10 %
Domestic carbon taxc AGF: 250 AGF: 4 %
Phase out of fossil fuel subsidies AGF: 8; G20: 40 – 60 AGF: 100 %; G20: 15 – 25 %
Higher fossil fuel royalties AGF: 10 AGF: 100 %
Wires charge on electricity generation AGF: 5 AGF: 100 %
2) Options that contribute to national budgets, dependent on international agreements
Border carbon cost levelling Grubb 2011: 5*
Financial transactions tax AGF: 2 – 27 AGF: 25 – 50 %
3) Funds collected internationally pursuant to an international agreement
Extension of the ‘share of proceeds’ AGF: 38 – 50 AGF: 2 – 10 %
Auctioning a portion of AAUs AGF: 125 – 250 b AGF: 2 – 10 %
Carbon pricing for international aviation***,a UNFCCC: 10 – 25**; AGF: 6; G20: 13 AGF: 25 – 50 %; G20: 33 – 50 % 
Carbon pricing for international shipping***,a UNFCCC: 10 – 15**; AGF: 16 – 19; G20: 26 AGF: 25 – 50 %; G20: 33 – 50 %
Notes: AGF, G20, and UNFCCC refer to estimates from AGF (2010), World Bank Group et al. (2011) and UNFCCC (2007), respectively.* = Date not specified; ** = 2006 USD; *** 
Could fall into category 2 depending upon the method of implementation; a The AGF and G20 estimates for international aviation and international shipping assume that a substan-
tial fraction (30 to 50 %) of the global revenue is allocated to developing countries. b The AGF combines auctioned AAUs and auctioned domestic allowances, here half of the total is 
included in each category; c The AGF estimates revenue of 10 billion USD per 1 USD tax per tonne of CO2, that is equivalent to potential revenue of 250 billion USD and a 4 % share 
for international climate finance as reported here. Sources: Compiled from AGF (2010), World Bank Group et al. (2011), UNFCCC (2007), and Grubb (2011).
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Carbon revenues may peak in the mid-term and decline in the long-
term, as decreasing emissions (the tax base) more than offset the 
increase in the carbon price (Carraro et  al., 2012). In regions with 
lower marginal abatement costs, the tax base shrinks faster so carbon 
revenues fall faster. Fast-growing regions may see growing carbon rev-
enues for several decades more.
Scenarios and / or regions in which absorption of emissions — e. g., by 
means of bioenergy with CCS — plays an important role may exhibit 
net negative emissions. This implies net reduction of carbon revenues 
so governments must finance net negative emissions using either the 
general budget or international funding (Carraro et al., 2012).
16.3 Enabling environments
This section highlights the importance of a supportive enabling 
environment in facilitating low-carbon investments. The concept of 
enabling environment is not clearly defined, so it has many different 
interpretations. One is government policies that focus on “creating 
and maintaining an overall macroeconomic environment” (UNCTAD, 
1998).24 Another (Bolger, 2000), interprets an ‘enabling environment’ 
as the wider context within which development processes take place, 
i. e., the role of societal norms, rules, regulations, and systems. This 
environment may either be supportive (enabling) or constraining.
According to Stadelmann and Michaelowa (2011), capacity build-
ing and enabling environment are separate but interrelated con-
cepts. Capacity building targets knowledge and skills gaps, while the 
enabling environment for low-carbon business activities is “the overall 
environment including policies, regulations and institutions that drive 
the business sector to invest in and apply low-carbon technologies and 
services.” According to this definition, the enabling environment has 
three main components: (1) the core business environment, which is 
relevant for all types of businesses, e. g., tax regime, labour market, and 
ease of starting and operating a business; (2) the broader investment 
climate, including education, financial markets, and infrastructure, 
which is partially low-carbon related, e. g., via climate change educa-
tion or investments in electricity grids; and (3) targeted policies that 
encourage the business sector to invest in low-carbon technologies. 
Capacity building can also be seen as a subcomponent of an enabling 
environment (UNFCCC, 2009b) as it aims to improve the enabling envi-
ronment by overcoming market, human, and institutional capacity bar-
riers. Support for capacity building can increase the probability that the 
recipient country will succeed in implementing mitigation policies, and 
hence may reduce the total funding needed (Urpelainen, 2010).
24 For enabling environments for technology transfer see McKenzie Hedger et al. 
(2000).
Reliability and predictability are important elements of an enabling 
environment. While stable and predictable government policies reduce 
uncertainty about expected return on investment, frequent and unpre-
dictable changes to policies can undermine market efficiency (Blyth 
et  al., 2007; Brunner et  al., 2012). Predictability and stability require 
well-established legal institutions and rule of law. Institutional capac-
ity across sectors and at various levels is also important (Brinkerhoff, 
2004).
In their econometric examination, Eyraud et al. (2011) found that low-
ering the cost of capital is particularly effective in boosting investment 
in low-carbon activities. Hence, macro-economic factors and policy 
regulatory frameworks that are good for private investment as a whole 
are also important determinants of climate investment. Put differently, 
obstacles that impede private investment also hamper investment 
in low-carbon technologies. More elements related to the drivers of 
low-carbon investments, which are part of enabling environments, are 
found in the next sub-section.
16.4 Financing low-
carbon investments, 
opportunities, and 
key drivers 
Financing mitigation projects is, in principle, similar to financing any 
other investment. This section provides an overview of factors that 
attract private capital for low-carbon investments. First, different 
categories of capital managers and their key investment criteria are 
introduced. Next, challenges that hamper investors, such as investment 
risks and access to capital, are assessed. Finally, selected financial 
instruments used in low-carbon transactions are presented and dis-
cussed.
16�4�1 Capital managers and investment 
decisions
Mitigation measures often are financed through investments by sev-
eral different capital managers (see Figure 16.1). It is crucial to under-
stand the basic investment logic and the preferred financial instru-
ments of each type of capital manager.25 Box 16.2 characterizes some 
of the major types of capital managers.
Risk and return are crucial decision factors in any investment finance 
decision, including low-carbon activities. The higher the perceived risk, 
25 For the different types of financing typically used, i. e., required, in the different 
stages of renewable technologies, such as R&D, commercialization, manufactur-
ing, and sales, see Mitchell et al.(2011).
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the higher the cost of capital and required return needing to be gener-
ated to cover the costs (i. e., higher risk results in a higher discount rate 
for cash flow) (Romani, 2009). 
Equity and debt are basically the two basic types of finance. Both 
come at a certain cost, which is very sensitive to risk, i. e., risk premium 
or risk margin. The type of finance required depends on the type of 
activity, its development phase, and its application. 
Project finance is usually the preferred financing approach for infra-
structure or energy projects worth more than 21.4 million USD (UNEP, 
2005). In this financing structure, debt and equity are paid back 
exclusively from the cash flows generated by the project and there 
is no recourse to the balance sheet (also call non-recourse finance); 
as opposed to balance-sheet financing, where all ‘on-balance sheet’ 
assets can be used as collateral. In 2012, around 70 billion USD of 
project-level market rate debt went towards emission reduction (70 % 
provided by the public sector). Project-level equity was estimated at 
approximately 11 billion USD. However, the largest share of mitiga-
tion , 198 billion USD, consisted of balance-sheet financing (2012 USD) 
(Buchner et al., 2013b).
Risk profile, tenor (i. e., loan duration) and size are the primary crite-
ria to characterize the financing demand. The total financing demand 
can be split into tranches with varying risk profiles (e. g., debt vs. 
equity) and varying tenors that match the characteristics of existing 
financing instruments. For renewable energy projects, higher cost of 
capital will increase start-up costs, which are generally front-loaded 
and higher per unit of capacity than for fossil fuel-based projects even 
if financing conditions are identical (Brunnschweiler, 2010). Lenders 
require a higher equity share if a project is perceived as risky. A typi-
cal project finance structure in an industrialized country consists of 
10 – 30 % equity, whereas in developing countries this share tends to 
be higher (UNEP, 2007). However, equity tends to be scarce in many 
developing countries (see Section 16.4.2.2).
16�4�2 Challenges for low-carbon investment
Factors that reduce the relative attractiveness of implementing a low-
carbon technology shall be considered as a challenge. Many factors 
pertaining to the general investment environment can have an enabling 
character or can act as a challenge (see Section 16.3). However, there 
Box 16�2 | Types of capital managers relevant for investment and finance in low-carbon activities
Governments commit to mitigation measures to comply with 
international agreements and self-imposed targets. Their role as 
capital managers is limited to mitigation measures where they 
invest directly. In 2011 and 2012, the public sector provided on 
average 135 billion USD per year (2011 / 2012 USD) of public fund-
ing for climate finance, thereof 12 billion USD provided directly by 
government bodies1 (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Public financial institutions include national, bilateral, multi-
lateral, and regional finance institutions, as well as UN agencies 
and national cooperation agencies. These institutions invested 
121 billion USD in mitigation and adaptation measures in 2012 
(2012 USD), more than 50 % was provided as concessional loans 
(Buchner et al., 2013b).
Commercial financial institutions, such as banks, pension 
funds, life insurance companies, and other funds, manage 
over 71 trillion USD in assets. They can have long-time horizon 
investments diversified across asset classes with varying risk return 
profiles and investment tenors, sectors, and geographies (Inderst 
1 This estimate excludes financing by public financial institutions and by dedi-
cated climate fund, the latter providing approximately 1.6 billion USD (2012 
USD) in 2012 (Buchner et al., 2013b).
et al., 2012). The ability of institutional investors to invest in mitiga-
tion measures depends on their investment strategy, restrictions 
agreed upon with their clients, as well as the regulatory framework. 
Life insurance and pension funds are especially constrained by the 
latter (Glemarec, 2011). Their contribution was estimated at 22 bil-
lion USD in 2012 (2012 USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Energy corporations including power and gas utilities, inde-
pendent power producers, energy companies, and independent 
project developers can design, commission, and operate renew-
able energy projects. They provided approximately 102 billion USD 
(2012 USD) for climate finance in 2012 (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Non-energy corporations invest in mitigation measures to 
reduce their energy bills, meet voluntary commitments or comply 
with emission trading schemes. Altogether, they provided around 
66 billion USD in 2012 for low-carbon investment (2012 USD) 
(Buchner et al., 2013b).
Households’ investments are funded by income and savings 
supplemented by loans. In 2012, households provided around 
33 billion USD for climate finance projects; 83 % of households’ 
contributions were in developed countries, especially in Germany, 
Japan, and Italy (Buchner et al., 2013b).
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are also low-carbon specific factors — especially in absence of a clear 
price signal for carbon emissions — that, if they remain, may keep the 
market penetration of these technologies to low percentages (Gilling-
ham and Sweeney, 2011). The latter will be assessed in this subsection.
Challenges vary significantly within the different investment catego-
ries, dependent upon the investor and the type of activity. For instance, 
each group is faced with some additional typical financial challenges. 
Energy-efficiency measures, for instance, often face misaligned incen-
tives between the asset owner, user, and lender. It is more complex for 
energy-efficiency projects to structure and share the underlying risks. 
In addition, energy savings are intangible as collateral (Hamilton and 
Justice, 2009; Ryan et al., 2012; Venugopal and Srivastava, 2012). 
Investment risks: Investments in low-carbon activities face partly the 
same risks as other investments in the same countries analogous to the 
core and broader investment climate. These risks can be broadly grouped 
into political risks (e. g., political instability, expropriation, transfer risk, 
breach of contract, etc.) and macro-economic risks (e. g., currency risk, 
financial risks, etc.). In some developing countries, political and macro-
economic risks represent a high barrier to investment (Ward et al., 2009; 
World Bank, 2011a; Venugopal and Srivastava, 2012).
There are also types of risks characteristic for low-carbon investments: 
Low-carbon policy risks are one type of these risks that concern the 
predictability, longevity, and reliability of policy, e. g., low-carbon regu-
lations might change or not be enforced (Ward et al., 2009; Venugopal 
and Srivastava, 2012; Frisari et al., 2013). Private capital will flow to 
those countries, or markets, where regulatory frameworks and policies 
provide confidence to investors over the time horizon of their invest-
ment (Carmody and Ritchie, 2007).
Mitigation activities also face specific technology and operational 
risk. For relatively new technologies, these are related to performance 
of the technology (i. e., initial production and long-term performance), 
delay in the construction, and the risk of not being able to access 
affordable capital (see Section  16.4.2.2). Some low-carbon activities 
also tend to depend on an expected future development, e. g., steep 
learning curves for certain technologies. Operational risks include the 
credit quality of the counterparties, off-take agreements, especially in 
a scenario where the mitigation technology has a higher costs of pro-
duction, supply chain scalability, unreliable support infrastructure, and 
maintenance costs (Jamison, 2010; Venugopal and Srivastava, 2012).
Moreover, risks may be overestimated due to limited information in 
markets that are undergoing a technological and structural transition 
(Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2006) and the longer time frame used to 
assess the risk increases uncertainty. A lack of quantitative analytical 
methodologies for risk management may add to the perceived risk.
Return on investment: The basic challenge is to find a financing 
package that provides the debt and equity investors with a reason-
able return on their investment given the perceived risks. Debt finan-
ciers have a strong interest in seeing that their loans are paid back 
and hence provide funds to less risky, proven technologies and estab-
lished companies (Hamilton, 2010). It is estimated that in 2009 they 
required an average internal rate of return (IRR) of around 3 to 7 % 
above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) reference interest 
rate, for renewable energy projects in industrialized countries. Ven-
ture capitalists, angel investors, and some foundations (through so-
called programme-related investments) are situated on the other side 
of the financing continuum. They typically invest in new companies 
and technologies, and are willing to take higher risks while expect-
ing commensurately larger returns. These investors may require an IRR 
of 50 % or higher because of the high chances that individual proj-
ects will fail. Private equity companies that invest in more established 
companies and technologies may still require an IRR of about 35 % 
(Hamilton and Justice, 2009). However, these typical IRRs have to be 
considered with care since they may vary according to the prevail-
ing basis interest rates (i. e., the current LIBOR rate), perceived risks of 
the investment category and the availability of alternative investment 
opportunities. Many renewable energy projects, especially in develop-
ing countries where additional risk margins are added, are struggling 
to reach returns of this level to satisfy the expectations of financiers 
of equity and debt.
Cost of capital and access to capital: In many countries, there are 
imperfections in the capital market restricting the access to affordable 
long-term capital (Maclean et  al., 2008). This is particularly the case 
in many developing countries where local banks are not able to lend 
for 15 – 25 years due to their own balance sheet constraints (Hamilton, 
2010), e. g., to match the maturity of assets and liabilities.
Attracting sufficient equity is often critical for low-carbon activi-
ties, especially for renewable energy projects in developing countries 
(Glemarec, 2011). The equity base of a company is used to attract 
(leverage) mezzanine or debt finance especially in project finance 
investments. Since equity is last in the risk order and can be recov-
ered only by means of sale of shares of the asset or its liquidation, 
return expectations are significantly higher than for debt or mezzanine 
finance. Often, equity is also the key limiting factor in the expansion of 
a low-carbon activity, e. g., through growth of a company, expansion 
into new markets, R&D, or multiplication of a project approach (UNEP, 
2005).
Market and project size: Since the pre-investment costs vary dis-
proportionally with the project size, smaller low-carbon projects incur 
much higher transaction costs than larger ones of conventional energy 
projects (Ward et  al., 2009). These costs include feasibility and due 
diligence work, legal and engineering fees, consultants, and permit-
ting costs. Hamilton (2010) finds that small low-carbon projects in 
developing countries seeking less than 10 million USD of debt are 
generally not attractive to an international commercial bank. Due to 
the higher transaction costs, small projects might also generate lower 
gross returns, even if the rate of return lies within the market stan-
dards (Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2006).
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There is basically no secondary market to raise debt for low-carbon 
projects. Hence, institutional investors, whose major asset class is 
bonds, lack opportunities to invest in low-carbon energy projects 
because they do not issue bonds or the issuance size is too small (Ham-
ilton and Justice, 2009; Kaminker and Stewart, 2012). The minimum 
issuance size for investment grade bonds tends to be about 460 mil-
lion USD, so few projects can achieve this standard (Veys, 2010). Many 
renewable energy projects need investment in the range of 70 – 700 
million USD, with only a few big ones towards the upper end (Hamil-
ton and Justice, 2009). In 2011, clean energy bonds amounted to only 
about 0.2 % of the global bond market (Kaminker and Stewart, 2012).
Tenor-risk combination: Capital markets tend to prefer a combina-
tion of long tenor with low risk and are willing to finance high risk only 
in the short term. Due to higher political and macro-economic instabil-
ity in developing countries, investors are particularly reluctant to invest 
in projects with such a long investment horizon. Although pension 
funds and insurance companies are long-term investors, concerns 
about quality and reliability of cash flow projections, credit ratings of 
off-takers for power purchase agreements, short-term performance 
pressures, and financial market regulations often inhibit them from 
investing in long-term low-carbon assets (Kaminker and Stewart, 
2012). Industrial firms also face constraints with extended payback 
periods, since they typically operate with a short-term horizon that 
requires rapid positive returns on investment (Della Croce et al., 2011). 
A significant positive consideration, however, is that low-carbon proj-
ects like waste heat, geothermal, wind, and solar have zero or negligi-
ble fuel price volatility risk.
Human resources and institutional capacity: The lack of technical 
and business capabilities at the firm, financial intermediary and regula-
tory level are significant barriers to harness low-carbon technologies, 
especially in many developing economies (Ölz and Beerepoot, 2010). In 
countries where private sector actors do not only own the low-carbon 
technology but are also predominately responsible for the diffusion of 
technologies in the market, capacity building efforts need to focus on 
these actors’ ability to develop, fund, and deploy the respective tech-
nologies (Lall, 2002; Figueiredo, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2011). 
16�4�3 Financial instruments
Policy instruments to incentivize mitigation activities are assessed in 
depth in Chapters 13, 14, and 15. Evidently a missing price signal for 
carbon emissions is a major obstacle for low-carbon investments. But 
not only in absence of such a price signal, other important measures 
can be applied to reduce critical barriers for low-carbon investment. 
Basic financial instruments are illustrated in Figure 16.1 and introduced 
in Section 16.4.1. This subsection focuses on three types of financial 
instruments with the following purposes: reducing risk, reducing the 
cost of capital, and providing access to capital, as well as enhancing 
cash-flows. Figure 16.5 illustrates in a simplified manner how these 
instruments can enhance market competitiveness of low-carbon proj-
ects. There is a growing literature on how the public sector can use 
these instruments to mobilize additional private finance, and can help 
to improve the risk-return profile of investments for low-carbon activi-
ties.
16�4�3�1 Reducing investment risks
Risk mitigation can play an essential part in helping to ensure that a 
successful project financing structure is achieved by transferring risk 
away from borrowers, lenders, and equity investors. Various instru-
ments provided by private insurers, and by means of public mecha-
nisms, can help to partially or fully reduce the exposure of investors to 
Figure 16�5 | Instruments to enhance market competitiveness of low-carbon projects.
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Total Credit Insurance
Production/Savings
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political risk, exchange rate fluctuations, business interruption, short-
falls in output, delays or damage during fabrication, construction, and 
operation of a product, project, and company (Marsh, 2006).
There is a wide portfolio of proven commercial- and government-sup-
ported risk mitigation products that can be instrumental in efficiently 
expanding low-carbon investment. Their allocation and application 
requires a substantial level of expertise, experience, and resources 
available in specialized insurance companies, export credit agencies, 
and selected commercial and development banks. Examples of such 
products are highlighted below. They signal the potential for expanded 
use of risk mitigation instruments to support low-carbon investment 
(Frisari et al., 2013).
Credit enhancements / guarantees, such as commercial credit insur-
ance and government guarantees, usually cover part of the loan and 
reduce the loss incurred by a lender if the borrower is unable to repay 
a loan. The lender must still evaluate the creditworthiness and condi-
tions of the loan, but these instruments can reduce the interest rate 
and improve the terms, thereby expanding the available credit or 
reducing the costs (Stadelmann et al., 2011a).
Trade credit insurance provides partial protection against certain 
commercial risks (e. g., counterparty default) and political risks (e. g., 
war and terrorism, expropriation, currency transfer, or conversion 
limitations) and other risks like non-honouring of sovereign financial 
obligations or breach of contract by sovereign actors (MIGA, 2012; 
OPIC, 2012). Such insurance is provided by commercial insurance 
companies and by governments to their manufacturers, exporters, or 
financiers. 
Production and savings guarantees are typically provided to their 
clients by energy service companies (ESCOs) and large energy per-
formance contracting (EPC) contractors. Only proven practices and 
technologies are eligible to receive these guarantees, covering both 
technical risk (from customer payment default due to non-performance 
attributable to the ESCO or EPC contractor), and comprehensive risk 
(defaults due to technical and financial creditworthiness of the cus-
tomer) (IDB, 2011).
Local currency finance can be used if currency fluctuations are par-
ticularly risky for a project or company because a major investment is 
made in foreign currency and revenues are in local currency. Loans in 
local currency or risk management swaps to hedge foreign currency 
liability back into respective local currency can be provided by develop-
ment finance institutions (IFC, 2013; TCX, 2013a). Structured funds like 
the Currency Exchange Fund (TCX) are dedicated to hedge these cross-
border currency and interest rate mismatches (TCX, 2013b).
By the end of 2012, the 20 largest emitting developed and develop-
ing countries with lower risk country grades for private sector invest-
ments were producing 70 % of global energy-related CO2 emissions 
(Harnisch and Enting, 2013). In investment-grade countries, risk miti-
gation instruments and access to long-term finance can be provided 
at reasonably low costs, and have the potential to mobilize substantial 
additional private sector mitigation investments. In other countries, 
low-carbon investment would have to rely mainly on domestic sources 
or international public finance. 
16�4�3�2 Reducing cost of and facilitating access to 
capital
In many situations, mitigation measures imply additional or incre-
mental investments. Independent of the specific role of equity or debt 
finance in these individual investments, and irrespective of potential 
future reductions of operating and maintenance costs, the level of 
these investments can be a severe barrier to the investment decisions 
of different investors (as outlined in Section 16.4.2).
Concessional or ‘soft’ loans are repayable funds provided at terms 
more favourable than those prevailing on the market including lower 
interest rates, longer tenor, longer grace period, and reduced level of 
collateral. Providers of concessional loans are typically development 
banks on behalf of governments. In international cooperation, conces-
sional loans of varying degree and type have been established as main 
financing instruments to support public sector entities and local banks 
by bilateral and multilateral development banks (Maclean et al., 2008; 
Birckenbach, 2010; UNEP, 2010, 2011, 2012). In 2011, bilateral finance 
institutions, for instance, disbursed 73 % of their mitigation finance 
as concessional loans (UNEP, 2012). National finance institutions pro-
vided around 87 % of their climate funding in 2010 / 2011 via soft loans 
(Buchner et al., 2012).
Grants are non-repayable funds provided to a recipient for a specific 
purpose by a government, public financial institution or charity. Grants 
can play an important role in reducing up-front capital investment 
costs, and meeting viability gaps for projects that are more expensive 
than business-as-usual (Buchner et al., 2012).
Rebates provide immediate price reductions for purchase of an eligible 
product. Rebates can be structured to decline over time, encouraging 
early adopters and reflecting anticipated technology cost reductions 
(de Jager and Rathmann, 2008). Rebates are typically administered 
by retailers of respective products, in cooperation with a government 
agency.
Tax deductions or tax credits increase the after-tax cash flow for a 
specific investment. Hence, they can have a similar effect as soft loans 
by reducing the net annual payments for the amortization of a capi-
tal investment. They can be useful in enticing profitable enterprises to 
enter the market for renewable energies to reduce their tax liabilities. 
However, they require to be embedded in a country’s tax system and 
a base in the tax code. Additionally, the specific level cannot be easily 
adapted to changed market conditions and will depend on the specific 
tax burden of the taxed entity (Wohlgemuth and Madlener, 2000).
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Equity plays a critical role in financing a project and it is potentially 
attractive for governments to provide equity to companies or projects 
to support desirable activities. At the same time, limited expertise of 
the public sector in allocating capital in risky operations and in man-
agement of companies, and problems arising from the relationships of 
owners and regulators, are frequently cited as reasons against a broad 
public engagement as equity investor. In support of emission mitiga-
tion activities, a number of approaches have been successfully dem-
onstrated. Because of the challenges discussed above, some public 
sector investors have decided to limit their equity investment to minor-
ity stakes and apply clear investment criteria to avoid crowding-out of 
private investors and to use defined exit strategies (IFC, 2009).
16�4�3�3 Enhancing cash flow
Nationally agreed feed-in tariffs (FITs) or third-party guaranteed 
renewable energy premiums for individual power purchase agree-
ments provide a secure long-term cash-flow to operators of renewable 
energy systems — based on technology, system size, and project loca-
tion. Debt and equity for a project can hence be secured due to the 
long duration, the guaranteed off-take of the electricity generated, and 
the grid access. Consequently, FITs do not only increase and stabilize 
the return, but also reduce the risks for developers, lenders, and inves-
tors. As a result, the cost of capital and required rate of return can 
be reduced as well (Cory et al., 2009; Kubert and Sinclair, 2011). The 
FITs for renewable energy have been implemented in a broad range 
of industrialized and developing countries (Fulton et  al., 2010). The 
level of the FIT for a specific technology, region and time determines 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme, but it is difficult to 
establish the appropriate level up front and to adapt it as the market 
evolves and the technology matures.
CO2 Offset-Mechanisms can also provide additional cash flow via 
the sales of credits to support the economics of a mitigation invest-
ment. Unlike renewable energy premiums, however, there is uncer-
tainty about the future level of this payment stream. This has made 
many financiers hesitant to provide debt finance for these projects. 
Some MDBs, like the ADB have a provision to buy credits upfront con-
tributing to investment capital and reducing uncertainty on the future 
cash-flows from the sale of carbon credits (ADB, 2011; Asian Develop-
ment Bank, 2012).
16.5 Institutional arrangements 
for mitigation financing
Institutions are essential to channel climate finance to mitigation 
and adaptation measures (Stadelmann, 2013) and to ensure that the 
actions funded respond to national needs and priorities in an efficient 
and effective way.26 Through institutions, knowledge is accumulated, 
codified, and passed on in a way that is easily transferable and used to 
build capacities, share knowledge, transfer technologies, help develop 
markets, and build enabling environments for effective climate invest-
ments. Without proper institutions, some actions and investments may 
remain simply as stand-alone projects with no lasting effects, or a one-
off capital equipment supply rather than a transaction with a transfer 
of skills, know-how, full knowledge of the technology, and a contri-
bution to a broader system of innovation and technological change 
(Ockwell et al., 2008).
16�5�1 International arrangements
Global arrangements for climate change mitigation finance are 
essential for several reasons. Most commonly cited is the fact that 
because the earth’s climate is a public good, investing within borders 
is often not seen as beneficial to a particular country unless doing so 
becomes a collective effort (Pfeiffer and Nowak, 2006). The UNFCCC, 
among others, was established to address this dilemma and turn the 
global effort on climate change into a collective action that would be 
seen by all as beneficial to the whole (Burleson, 2007). Trusted institu-
tions are needed to channel and implement the funding in an orderly 
and efficient process. 
Funds that are part of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC are 
subject to guidance from the COP. Until recently, these included only 
the GEF Trust Fund, the SCCF and the LDCF, all of which are adminis-
tered by the GEF (see Section 16.2.1.1) (UNFCCC, 2013b). In 2010, the 
COP decided to establish the GCF to be designated as a new operating 
entity of the Financial Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2010). The GCF, that is 
currently being operationalized, is expected to become the main global 
fund to support climate action in developing countries, but it has not 
yet been capitalized. In addition, the Adaptation Fund has been estab-
lished under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The UNFCCC recognizes that funding for mitigation may come from a 
variety of sources and through a variety of channels beyond the finan-
cial mechanism, such as multilateral and bilateral institutions engaged 
in official development assistance. There has been an expansion in 
the number of public and private climate funds in the last decade. The 
UNDP estimates that over the last decade some 50 international public 
funds, 45 carbon market funds, in addition to 6000 private equity funds 
(set up largely independent of international climate policy) have been 
established for the purpose of funding climate change-related activi-
ties (UNDP, 2011). Some of these, such as CIFs are multi-donor funds 
administered by the World Bank but with their own governance and 
26 The term ‘institution’ in this context is defined narrowly to mean an established 
organization dedicated to facilitate, manage, or promote mitigation finance, as 
opposed to the broader meaning of the term commonly used in the study of the 
social sciences and used to mean a structure or mechanism of social order and 
cooperation governing the behaviour of individuals in society, e. g., the institutions 
of marriage or religion. 
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organizational structure. The CIFs were designed as an interim measure 
to demonstrate how scaled-up support can be provided and include 
a sunset clause linked to progress on the financial architecture under 
UNFCCC. They consist of two trust funds: the Clean Technology Fund 
(CTF), which promotes scaled-up financing for demonstration, deploy-
ment, and transfer of low-carbon technologies with significant poten-
tial for long-term GHG emissions savings, and the Strategic Climate 
Fund (SCF), under which are three separate initiatives for piloting trans-
formational, scaled-up action on climate change (World Bank, 2011b; 
c). The pledges and contributions to the CIFs are recorded as ODA, and 
therefore constitute a multi-bilateral arrangement (World Bank, 2010). 
The CDM and carbon funds are directly linked to emission. Prior to the 
decline of certificate prices, they played a central role in attracting cli-
mate investments. The CDM is one of three trading mechanisms cre-
ated by the Kyoto Protocol that a developed country can use to help 
meet its national commitment. The CDM allows a developed country 
to use credits issued for emission reductions in developing countries. 
The other two mechanisms — Joint Implementation (JI) and Interna-
tional Emissions Trading (IET) — involve only developed countries with 
national commitments. The CDM is the largest of the mechanisms 
(UNFCCC, 2013c). Some of the carbon funds have been established by 
multilateral financial institutions. The World Bank established the first 
fund, the Prototype Carbon Fund, in 1999, and has since created sev-
eral additional funds (World Bank, 2013). 
There are several institutions promoting mitigation finance by private 
actors, which frequently combine financial power of up to several tril-
lions. However, their scope of work differs considerably. Some of the 
major private sector institutions include inter alia the World Business 
Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (WBCSD, 2013), the 
Climate Markets and Investment Association (CMIA) (CMIA, 2013), 
and the Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change (Global Investor 
Coalition on Climate Change, 2013). 
Regional arrangements play an important role in fostering regional 
cooperation and stimulating action and funding. These regional insti-
tutions include the regional multilateral development banks and the 
regional economic commissions of the United Nations on the multilat-
eral side.27 They are increasingly engaging in the promotion of mitiga-
tion and adaptation activities in their respective regions and establish-
ing and helping to manage regional financing arrangements (Sharan, 
2008). In the Asia and Pacific region, examples of regional financial 
arrangements to promote funding for mitigation activities include 
ADB´s Clean Energy Financing Partnership Facility, the Asia Pacific Car-
bon Fund, and the Future Carbon Fund. Other regional development 
banks have been equally active (Asian Development Bank, 2013a; b; c).
27 Economic Commission for Latin America, Inter American Development Bank 
(IDB), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), African Development Bank (AfDB), 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), European Bank for Reconstruction, 
and Development (EBRD).
Regional groupings such as the Economic Community for West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration, Merco-
sur, Corporación Andina de Fomento, and the Andean Pact, to name 
just a few, have been actively promoting sub-regional integration of 
energy systems and cooperation in climate change activities in devel-
oping countries for some years. In the developed world, one of the best 
examples of these regional political groupings is the European Union, 
which has been very active in the area of climate change and in sup-
porting activities in developing countries.
Bilateral cooperation arrangements are widely used by donor 
countries to provide funding to partner country governments and their 
implementing organizations. They frequently involve development 
banks and agencies with a proven track record in international coop-
eration. The three principal means to channel climate change fund-
ing bilaterally are (1) bilateral programmes for funding international 
cooperation in the energy, water, transport, or forestry, (2) dedicated 
funding windows established to target climate change funding open 
to a wider range of implementing institutions, and (3) new funds 
implemented by bilateral development institutions with their own 
governance structure. The OECD has established a framework for the 
implementation and reporting modalities that can be applied to all 
climate-relevant ODA and partially for other official flows (see OECD, 
(2013b) for agreed principles on statistics, effectiveness, evaluation, 
and the like). Officially supported export credits provided by export 
credit agencies on behalf of national governments are also covered by 
a respective OECD arrangement (OECD, 2013c).
Triangular cooperation arrangements are defined by the OECD as 
those involving a traditional donor, most likely a member of DAC, an 
emerging donor in the south (providers of South-South Cooperation), 
and the beneficiary countries or recipients of development aid (Forde-
lone, 2011). Although they have grown in number in recent years, 
triangular arrangements, and particularly those for climate change 
financing, are a relatively recent mode of development cooperation 
(ECOSOC, 2008). These arrangements have attracted a number of coun-
tries particularly for technology cooperation across sectors or specified 
industries. The rise of triangular arrangements has been driven by the 
growing role of middle-income countries and their increasing presence 
in providing development co-operation in addition to receiving it, and 
by the desire to experiment with other types of cooperation where the 
experience of developing countries can be brought to bear.
16�5�2 National and sub-national arrangements 
The landscape of institutional arrangements for action on climate 
change is diverse. In many countries, actions on climate change are not 
clearly defined as such. Consequently, many of the national arrange-
ments that exist to promote programmes and activities that contribute 
to mitigation do not appear in the literature as institutions dedicated 
to support climate finance.
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In many countries, particularly in developed countries and in a few 
larger developing countries, finance for mitigation comes mainly from 
the private sector, often with public support through regulatory and 
policy frameworks and / or specialized finance mechanisms. Institu-
tional arrangements and mechanisms that are successful in mobilizing 
and leveraging private capital tend to be more cost-effective in climate 
change mitigation, but some projects with low private investments 
(e. g., projects reducing industrial GHGs or projects owned by state-
owned enterprises) are also among the most cost-effective (Stadel-
mann, 2013). The institutions and public finance mechanisms are 
diverse, but all aim to help commercial financial institutions to do this 
job effectively and efficiently. Many of the institutions support special-
ized public finance mechanisms such as dedicated credit lines, guaran-
tees to share the risks of investments and debt financing of projects, 
microfinance or incentive funds, and schemes to mobilize R&D and 
technical assistance funds to build capacities across the sectors, includ-
ing the private and commercial sectors (Maclean et al., 2008). National 
development banks play an important role in financing domestic cli-
mate projects in many countries especially by providing concessional 
funding (Smallridge et al., 2012; Höhne et al., 2012; IDFC, 2013).
Many developing countries, other than the larger ones, are trying to 
cope with the multiplicity of sources, agents and channels offering cli-
mate finance (Glemarec, 2011). These efforts take two forms. 
One form is coordination of national efforts to address climate change 
by relevant government institutions. Very few developing countries 
have an institution fully dedicated to climate finance (Gomez-Echeverri, 
2010). Rather, climate finance decisions involve multiple ministries 
and agencies often coordinated by the ministry of the environment. 
Involvement of ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of finance 
is becoming more common due to their engagement in international 
negotiations and the promise of increased resources under UNFCCC. 
The second form is the establishment of specialized national funding 
entities designed specifically to mainstream climate change activities 
in overall development strategies. These institutions blend interna-
tional climate funding with domestic public funds and private sector 
resources (Flynn, 2011). Table 16.2 lists examples of national funding 
entities. A common feature is the desire to allocate resources for activi-
ties that are fully mainstreamed to the national needs and priorities. To 
do this, the national funding entities seek to tap the numerous interna-
tional sources of climate finance and supplement them with domestic 
resources. They are also expected to develop the governance and 
capacity requirements for ‘direct access’ to funds from the Adaptation 
Fund and the GCF.28
28 Direct access means that an accredited institution in the recipient country may 
receive funds directly to implement a project. Currently, most international funding 
institutions insist that projects be implemented by a multilateral development 
bank or UN agency.
In many countries, sub-national arrangements are increasingly becom-
ing an effective vehicle for advancing energy and climate change 
goals. These arrangements and the institutions that support them are 
being established to advance regional collaboration in areas of com-
mon interest and to benefit from greater efficiency and effectiveness 
through actions with greater geographical coverage (Setzer, 2009). For 
example, because of their population densities and economic activi-
ties, cities are major contributors to global GHG emissions, and as such 
they are major potential contributors to worldwide mitigation efforts 
(Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). In recent years, there has been an increase 
in the number of networks and initiatives specifically dedicated to 
enhance the role of cities in the fight against climate change. As a 
result, these initiatives are potentially big contributors to mitigation 
efforts, but because of the lack of clear processes linking these initia-
tives to national and international climate change policy, their impact 
in broader policy frameworks is less certain (UN-Habitat, 2011). One 
possible opportunity for enhancing this linkage is through the new 
National Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) being submitted by 
developing countries within the context of UNFCCC. The NAMA pro-
cess agreed to at Bali provides an opportunity to incorporate sectoral 
policies with relevance to their cities (Li, 2011).
16�5�3 Performance in a complex institutional 
landscape
The institutional landscape for climate finance is becoming increas-
ingly complex as interest of actors to enter the field of climate change 
finance and mitigation activities in developing countries increases. As 
in other international cooperation, there are discussions about effec-
tiveness of climate finance (see OECD (2008) for politically agreed prin-
ciples on aid effectiveness). Concerns have been raised about divert-
ing attention and resources from development aid, i. e., ODA, such 
as health and education, the additionality of expanded funding for 
mitigation and adaptation (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011), the 
difficulty of defining and measuring comparable results and achieving 
coherence with national priorities and development strategies, the lack 
of transparency, the fragmentation and duplication of efforts, and that 
the number of established funds may undermine the authority of the 
operating entities of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC (Poerter 
et al., 2008). The proliferation of climate funds (HBF and ODI, 2013) 
and funding channels with their own governance procedures can cre-
ate a substantial bureaucratic burden for recipients (Greene, 2004). 
Compounding these problems is the fragmentation of governance 
architectures that prevail in most developing countries (Biermann 
et al., 2009). Climate finance may be more effective if the operation 
of related institutions is streamlined and the capacity in developing 
countries to cope with the increasing number of these institutions 
is developed further. Evidence on the effectiveness of institutions to 
mainstream climate change mitigation and adaptation activities is cur-
rently lacking.
Table 16�2 | A sample of national funding entities in developing countries. Sources: Adapted from Gomez-Echeverri (2010), updated based on UNDP and World Bank (2012), 
Amazon Fund (2012), BCCRF (2012), CDMF (2012), ICCTF (2012), World Bank (2012b), UNDP (2013b).
Name, country, 
establishment
Description Source of fund and operations Governance
Amazon Fund, Brazil
(2010)
Established to combat deforestation and promote 
sustainable development in the Amazon. Focus: 
adaptation and mitigation
Designed to attract national and private investment 
for Amazon rainforest projects as well as donations 
and earnings from non-reimbursable investments 
made
Managed by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), a Guidance Committee composed of 
federal and state governments and civil society, and 
a Technical Committee 
Bangladesh Climate 
Change Resilience Fund 
(BCCRF)
(2010)
Established to provide support for the 
implementation of Bangladesh’s Climate 
Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 – 2018 
and particularly vulnerable communities. Focus: 
adaptation and mitigation
Designed to attract funds from UNFCCC finance 
mechanisms, and direct donor support
Managed by a board composed of Ministers of 
Environment, Finance, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, 
and Women and Children Affairs and disaster 
management, as well as donors and civil society 
organizations
China CDM Fund (CDMF)
(2007)
Established jointly by Ministries of Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, Science and Technology, and National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
Focus: mitigation
Funded by revenues generated from CDM projects 
in China, as well as grants from domestic and 
international institutions
Governed by the Board of the China CDM Fund that 
comprises representatives of seven line ministries, 
and managed and operated by a management 
centre affiliated with the Ministry of Finance
Indonesia Climate 
Change Trust Fund 
(ICCTF)
(2010)
Established jointly by the National Development 
Planning Agency and Ministry of Finance to pool and 
coordinate funds from various sources to finance 
Indonesia’s climate change policies and programmes 
Currently funded by grants from development 
partners but designed for direct access to 
international climate funding and to attract private 
funding
The UNDP is an interim Trustee operating under 
a Steering Committee headed by the National 
Development Planning Agency that also includes 
donors and other line ministries
Guyana REDD Investment 
Fund (GRIF)
(2010)
Established to finance activities under the Low 
Carbon Development Strategy of Guyana and to 
create an innovative climate finance mechanism. 
Focus: mitigation and adaptation
Designed to attract donor support. Operates under 
a performance-based funding modality, based on an 
independent verification of Guyana’s deforestation 
and forest degradation rates and progress on REDD+ 
enabling activities
A Steering Committee with members of government 
and financial contributors chaired by the 
Government of Guyana, is the decision making 
and oversight body. The International Development 
Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group acts as 
Trustee and the partner entities provide operational 
services
Ethiopia
Climate Resilient Green 
Economy Facility
(2012)
Established to support country’s vision of attaining a 
middle-income economy with low-carbon growth by 
2020. Focus: mitigation and adaptation
Designed to mobilize, access, and blend both local 
and international public and private resources to 
support Ethiopia’s Climate Resilience Green Economy 
Strategy 
Governed by a Ministerial Steering Committee 
chaired by Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development with an advisory body composed of 
development partners, multilateral organizations, 
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
civil society, private sector, and academia
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16.6 Synergies and tradeoffs 
between financing 
mitigation and adaptation 
This section introduces a conceptual framework linking adaptation 
and mitigation in terms of financing and investment. Estimates of 
investments needed for mitigation are provided in Section 16.2.2, and 
for adaptation investments in the sectoral chapters of the Working 
Group II report. First, this section addresses the interactions of financ-
ing adaptation and mitigation in terms of their specific effectiveness 
and tradeoffs, as well as their competition for funding over time. Sec-
ond, it discusses examples of integrated financing approaches.
16�6�1 Optimal balance between mitigation 
and adaptation and time dimension
Both mitigation and adaptation measures are necessary to effectively 
avoid harmful climate impacts. However, an assessment on whether, 
where, and which types of adaptation and mitigation measures and 
policies are substitutes or complements requires theoretical analysis and 
empirical evidence (Section 13.3.3). Investing in mitigation may reduce 
the need to invest in adaptation, and vice versa. Several authors have 
recognized that optimal mitigation and adaptation strategies should be 
jointly determined (Schelling, 1992; Kane and Shogren, 2000; Dellink 
et  al., 2009; Bosello et  al., 2010), including from the perspective of a 
global decision maker. The optimal balance of mitigation and adaptation 
depends on their relative costs, for any given profile of climate change 
impacts. To avoid inefficiencies, the socially discounted rate of return on 
resources invested in mitigation and adaptation should be equal. There-
fore, mitigation and adaptation compete to attract investments. From 
the perspective of simple economic models, a reduction in the costs of 
mitigation should lead to more mitigation and less adaptation, and, 
according to this view, they are substitutes (Ingham et al., 2005).
From the perspective of development and climate studies (Tol, 2007; 
Ayers and Huq, 2009), climate change in most cases will impact the 
economy by reducing its production potential (part of the residual 
damage), and the level of impacts will depend on its efficiency, diver-
sity, and vulnerability, as well as on how institutions are able to adapt. 
In many countries, particularly in developed countries and in a few 
larger developing countries, finance for mitigation comes mainly from 
the private sector, often with public support through regulatory and 
policy frameworks and / or specialized finance mechanisms. Institu-
tional arrangements and mechanisms that are successful in mobilizing 
and leveraging private capital tend to be more cost-effective in climate 
change mitigation, but some projects with low private investments 
(e. g., projects reducing industrial GHGs or projects owned by state-
owned enterprises) are also among the most cost-effective (Stadel-
mann, 2013). The institutions and public finance mechanisms are 
diverse, but all aim to help commercial financial institutions to do this 
job effectively and efficiently. Many of the institutions support special-
ized public finance mechanisms such as dedicated credit lines, guaran-
tees to share the risks of investments and debt financing of projects, 
microfinance or incentive funds, and schemes to mobilize R&D and 
technical assistance funds to build capacities across the sectors, includ-
ing the private and commercial sectors (Maclean et al., 2008). National 
development banks play an important role in financing domestic cli-
mate projects in many countries especially by providing concessional 
funding (Smallridge et al., 2012; Höhne et al., 2012; IDFC, 2013).
Many developing countries, other than the larger ones, are trying to 
cope with the multiplicity of sources, agents and channels offering cli-
mate finance (Glemarec, 2011). These efforts take two forms. 
One form is coordination of national efforts to address climate change 
by relevant government institutions. Very few developing countries 
have an institution fully dedicated to climate finance (Gomez-Echeverri, 
2010). Rather, climate finance decisions involve multiple ministries 
and agencies often coordinated by the ministry of the environment. 
Involvement of ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of finance 
is becoming more common due to their engagement in international 
negotiations and the promise of increased resources under UNFCCC. 
The second form is the establishment of specialized national funding 
entities designed specifically to mainstream climate change activities 
in overall development strategies. These institutions blend interna-
tional climate funding with domestic public funds and private sector 
resources (Flynn, 2011). Table 16.2 lists examples of national funding 
entities. A common feature is the desire to allocate resources for activi-
ties that are fully mainstreamed to the national needs and priorities. To 
do this, the national funding entities seek to tap the numerous interna-
tional sources of climate finance and supplement them with domestic 
resources. They are also expected to develop the governance and 
capacity requirements for ‘direct access’ to funds from the Adaptation 
Fund and the GCF.28
28 Direct access means that an accredited institution in the recipient country may 
receive funds directly to implement a project. Currently, most international funding 
institutions insist that projects be implemented by a multilateral development 
bank or UN agency.
Table 16�2 | A sample of national funding entities in developing countries. Sources: Adapted from Gomez-Echeverri (2010), updated based on UNDP and World Bank (2012), 
Amazon Fund (2012), BCCRF (2012), CDMF (2012), ICCTF (2012), World Bank (2012b), UNDP (2013b).
Name, country, 
establishment
Description Source of fund and operations Governance
Amazon Fund, Brazil
(2010)
Established to combat deforestation and promote 
sustainable development in the Amazon. Focus: 
adaptation and mitigation
Designed to attract national and private investment 
for Amazon rainforest projects as well as donations 
and earnings from non-reimbursable investments 
made
Managed by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), a Guidance Committee composed of 
federal and state governments and civil society, and 
a Technical Committee 
Bangladesh Climate 
Change Resilience Fund 
(BCCRF)
(2010)
Established to provide support for the 
implementation of Bangladesh’s Climate 
Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 – 2018 
and particularly vulnerable communities. Focus: 
adaptation and mitigation
Designed to attract funds from UNFCCC finance 
mechanisms, and direct donor support
Managed by a board composed of Ministers of 
Environment, Finance, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, 
and Women and Children Affairs and disaster 
management, as well as donors and civil society 
organizations
China CDM Fund (CDMF)
(2007)
Established jointly by Ministries of Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, Science and Technology, and National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
Focus: mitigation
Funded by revenues generated from CDM projects 
in China, as well as grants from domestic and 
international institutions
Governed by the Board of the China CDM Fund that 
comprises representatives of seven line ministries, 
and managed and operated by a management 
centre affiliated with the Ministry of Finance
Indonesia Climate 
Change Trust Fund 
(ICCTF)
(2010)
Established jointly by the National Development 
Planning Agency and Ministry of Finance to pool and 
coordinate funds from various sources to finance 
Indonesia’s climate change policies and programmes 
Currently funded by grants from development 
partners but designed for direct access to 
international climate funding and to attract private 
funding
The UNDP is an interim Trustee operating under 
a Steering Committee headed by the National 
Development Planning Agency that also includes 
donors and other line ministries
Guyana REDD Investment 
Fund (GRIF)
(2010)
Established to finance activities under the Low 
Carbon Development Strategy of Guyana and to 
create an innovative climate finance mechanism. 
Focus: mitigation and adaptation
Designed to attract donor support. Operates under 
a performance-based funding modality, based on an 
independent verification of Guyana’s deforestation 
and forest degradation rates and progress on REDD+ 
enabling activities
A Steering Committee with members of government 
and financial contributors chaired by the 
Government of Guyana, is the decision making 
and oversight body. The International Development 
Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group acts as 
Trustee and the partner entities provide operational 
services
Ethiopia
Climate Resilient Green 
Economy Facility
(2012)
Established to support country’s vision of attaining a 
middle-income economy with low-carbon growth by 
2020. Focus: mitigation and adaptation
Designed to mobilize, access, and blend both local 
and international public and private resources to 
support Ethiopia’s Climate Resilience Green Economy 
Strategy 
Governed by a Ministerial Steering Committee 
chaired by Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development with an advisory body composed of 
development partners, multilateral organizations, 
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
civil society, private sector, and academia
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On the other hand, policies to address mitigation and / or adaptation 
could promote the transfer of technologies and financial resources, and 
strengthen institutions and markets, which could lead to the enhance-
ment of a country’s productive capacity (Halsnæs and Verhagen, 2007).
Combined mitigation and adaptation strategies taking into account 
cost-effectiveness may involve economic tradeoffs. The optimal bal-
ance, including allocation of resources, should be determined taking 
into account possible co-benefits, which may be difficult to assess. 
Many actions that integrate mitigation and adaptation have enough 
co-benefits to make obvious sense of their immediate implementation 
(see Working Group II report), in spite of the fact that in many cases, 
assessment of their effective combination, cost-effectiveness, and trad-
eoffs requires improved information, improved capacities for analysis 
and action, and further policymaking (Wilbanks and Sathaye, 2007). 
Modelling of any direct interaction between adaptation and mitiga-
tion in terms of their specific effectiveness and tradeoffs would also be 
desirable (Wang and McCarl, 2011).
An analysis on the time composition (timing of mitigation and adap-
tation) of the optimal climate change strategy is also important to 
assess how to best allocate climate change funds. Emerging frame-
works for assessing the tradeoffs between adaptation and mitigation 
include those from the point of view of risks and costs. People invest 
resources to reduce the risk they confront or create (Ehrlich and Becker, 
1972; Lewis and Nickerson, 1989). Recent studies have used inte-
grated assessment models to numerically calculate the optimal alloca-
tion of investments between mitigation and adaptation. They confirm 
the analytical insights of Kane and Shogren (2000) and suggest that 
investments in mitigation should anticipate investments in adaptation 
(Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007; de Bruin et al., 2009; Bosello et al., 2010). 
The reason for this is because climate and economic systems have iner-
tia and delaying action increases the costs of achieving a given tem-
perature target. These studies suggest that the competition between 
mitigation and adaptation funds extends over time.
By arguing “uncertainty on the location of damages reduces the benefits 
of ‘targeted’ proactive adaptation with regard to mitigation and reactive 
adaptation”, some authors reinforce the idea that it is optimal to wait to 
invest in adaptation (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007). For the above reasons, 
Carraro and Massetti (2011) suggest that the greatest share of the GCF 
should finance emissions reductions rather than adaptation in develop-
ing countries. Other authors propose a framework that could integrate 
into an optimization model not only mitigation and adaptation, but also 
climate change residual damages. In the light of the uncertain impacts of 
climate change, prioritizing mitigation measures is justified, on the basis 
of a precautionary approach. Adaptation actions “should be optimally 
designed, consistently with mitigation, as a residual strategy addressing 
the damage not accommodated by mitigation” (Bosello et al., 2010). 
Wang and McCarl (2011) recognizes that, in terms of an overall invest-
ment shared between mitigation and adaptation, mitigation tackles 
the long-run cause of climate change while adaptation tackles the 
short-run reduction of damages and is preferred when damage stocks 
are small. Contrary to Bosello et al. (2010), they advocate that, instead 
of taking adaptation as a ‘residual’ strategy, well-planned adaptation 
is an economically effective complement to mitigation since the begin-
ning and should occur in parallel. Thus, adaptation investment should 
be considered as an important current policy option due to the near-
term nature of given benefits. 
Moreover, the optimal balance of adaptation and mitigation measures 
and investments should be determined in function of the magnitude 
of climate change; “if mitigation can keep climate change to a moder-
ate level, then adaptation can handle a larger share of the resulting 
impact vulnerabilities” (Wilbanks et al., 2007). While the uncertainties 
about specific pathways remain, and although there are different con-
siderations on their optimal balance, there is a general agreement that 
funding for both mitigation and adaptation is needed.
16�6�2 Integrated financing approaches
Despite the lack of modelling of any direct interaction between adapta-
tion and mitigation in terms of financing, there is an increasing interest 
in promoting integrated financing approaches, addressing both adap-
tation and mitigation activities in different sectors and at different lev-
els. Although the GCF will have thematic funding windows for adapta-
tion and mitigation, an integrated approach will be used to allow for 
cross-cutting projects and programmes (UNFCCC, 2011c, para 37).
The theoretical literature reviewed in Section 16.1.1 provides only gen-
eral guidance on financing mitigation and adaptation measures. Analy-
sis of specific adaptation and mitigation options in different sectors 
reveals that adaptation and mitigation can positively and negatively 
influence the effectiveness of each other (see also Working Group II 
report). Particular opportunities for synergies exist in some sectors 
(Klein et al., 2007), including agriculture (Niggli et al., 2009), forestry 
(Ravindranath, 2007; Isenberg and Potvin, 2010), and buildings and 
urban infrastructure (Satterthwaite, 2007). 
Mitigation activities have global benefits while most adaptation 
activities benefit a smaller geographical area or population. Funding 
sources with a regional, national or sub-national perspective, therefore, 
will increasingly favour adaptation over mitigation measures (Dowla-
tabadi, 2007; Wilbanks and Sathaye, 2007). Thus the sources of climate 
finance available may yield a mix of mitigation and adaptation mea-
sures quite different from the global optimal mix. Additional studies 
“to understand the complex way in which local adaptation aggregates 
to the global level” are needed (Patt et al., 2009). Although the optimal 
mix cannot be determined precisely, the availability of international cli-
mate finance for both mitigation and adaptation is necessary to coun-
teract such tendencies.
Taking into account the strong regional nature of climate change 
impacts, a regional financing arrangement will be more responsive 
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and relevant than a global one, and may play an important role in 
adaptation (Sharan, 2008). Regional funding tools have made arrange-
ments for financing adaptation activities in complement to mitigation 
measures: e. g., the Poverty and Environment Fund (PEF) of the Asian 
Development Bank promotes the mainstreaming of environmental and 
climate change considerations into development strategies, plans, pro-
grammes, and projects of the bank (ADB, 2003).
The AfDB acts as manager and coordinator of new funding for the 
Congo Basin forest ecosystem conservation and sustainable manage-
ment (UNEP, 2008). According to the operational procedures by AfDB, 
to be eligible for financing under the Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), 
project proposals and initiatives considered for funding should, among 
other things, aim at slowing the rate of deforestation, contribute to 
poverty alleviation, provide some contribution to climate stabiliza-
tion and GHG emissions reduction, and may show environment, eco-
nomic, and social risk assessment in addition to appropriate mitigation 
measures, as well as be supported by national strategies to combat 
deforestation while preserving biodiversity and promoting sustainable 
development (AfDB, 2009). See Section 14.3.2 for additional informa-
tion on regional examples of cooperation schemes identifying syner-
gies between mitigation and adaptation financing. 
Many ongoing bilateral and multilateral development activities address 
mitigation and adaptation at the same time. A recent survey by Illmann 
et al. (2013) discusses examples from agriculture (conversion of fallow 
systems into continuously cultivated area; the reuse of wastewater for 
irrigation), forestry (reforestation with drought-resistant varieties; man-
grove plantations), and from the energy sector (rural electrification with 
renewable energy, production of charcoal briquettes from agricultural 
waste). The study identifies significant potential to further mobilize 
these synergies within existing development cooperation programmes.
Another point of debate regarding synergies and tradeoffs between 
financing mitigation and adaptation relates to the conceptual frame-
work that suggests allocating responsibility for international financing 
of adaptation based on the historical contribution of countries to climate 
change in terms of GHG emissions and their capacity to pay for the costs 
of adaptation at international level (Dellink et al., 2009). The provision of 
international climate finance, of course, raises other issues of equity and 
burden sharing, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.
16.7 Financing developed 
countries’ mitigation 
activities
This and the next section consider the manner in which developed and 
developing countries may choose to finance the incremental invest-
ments and operating costs associated with GHG mitigation activities. 
It is fully recognized that a country’s individual circumstances will in 
large part determine how financing is accomplished, and further, that 
individual national circumstances vary widely among members of the 
developed and developing country groups.
The manner in which developed countries finance their mitigation 
activities depends largely on the policies chosen to limit GHG emis-
sions and the ownership of the sources of emissions. Policies and 
ownership also determine the distribution of the burdens posed by 
the financing needs, i. e., if it will be financed by households and firms 
through higher prices, taxes, or both.
In 2011 and 2012, on average, 177 billion USD of global climate 
finances were invested in developed countries (49 % of the global 
total climate finance) of which the vast majority (81 %) originated in 
the same country as the investment was undertaken (2011 / 2012 USD) 
(Buchner et al., 2013b). Due to the financial crisis investment in renew-
able energy in developed countries dropped 14 % in 2009 (Frankfurt 
School-UNEP Centre and BNEF, 2012), but saw a rapid recovery due 
to the green stimulus packages (IEA, 2009; REN21, 2010). The eight 
development banks of OECD countries that are members of the 
International Development Finance Club (IDFC) allocated 28 billion 
USD (2011 USD) and 33 billion USD (2012 USD) ‘green’29 finance to 
domestic projects in 2011 and 2012, respectively (Höhne et al., 2012; 
IDFC, 2013). Public climate finance was also directed to developing 
countries at a range of 35 – 49 billion USD per year for 2011 and 2012 
(2011 / 2012 USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Without climate policy, an estimated 96 (70 – 126) billion USD per year 
of investment in fossil power generation will occur in developed coun-
tries from 2010 – 2029; from 2030 to 2049, this figure increases to 131 
(86 – 215) billion USD per year. In a climate policy scenario compatible 
with a 2 °C warming limit in 2100, OECD countries are expected to 
reduce investments in fossil power generation by 57 % (– 2 to – 89 %) 
during 2010 – 2029, but investments will drop by 90 % (– 80 to – 98 %) 
during 2030 – 2049. Investment in renewable power generation instead 
will increase by 86 % (58 to 116 %) during 2010 – 2029 and by 200 % 
(77 to 270 %) during 2030 – 2049 (based on IEA (2011), Carraro et al. 
(2012), Calvin et al. (2012) and McCollum et al. (2013), used in Sec-
tion 16.2.2).
To date, public sourcing for climate finance originates primarily from 
general tax revenues. However, under ambitious stabilization targets, 
financial sources that yield mitigation benefits have the potential to 
generate high revenues that could be used for climate finance. Carbon 
taxes and the auctioning of emissions allowances carry the highest 
potential, a phaseout of fossil fuel subsidies, and a levy or emission 
trading scheme for international aviation and shipping emissions are 
29 ‘Green’ finance as reported by IDFC includes projects with other environmental 
benefits. Approximately 93 % (80 %) of the ‘green’ finance by IDFC in 2011 
(2012) was climate finance (Höhne et al., 2012; IDFC, 2013).
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estimated to generate considerable revenues as well (UNFCCC, 2007; 
AGF, 2010; World Bank Group et al., 2011). 
Most developed countries offer a reasonably attractive core and 
broader enabling environment for climate investments. Developed 
countries, as do many emerging economies, combine substantial 
energy-related GHG emission reduction potential with low country 
risks. At the end of 2012, 29 out of 36 assessed developed countries 
fell into the group of lower risk country grade, producing 39 % of 
global fuel-related CO2 emissions (Harnisch and Enting, 2013). Pri-
vate finance can thus be the main source of low-carbon investment in 
these countries, however private actors are often dependent on public 
support through regulatory and policy frameworks and / or specialized 
finance mechanisms.
While macroeconomic and policy risk have been reasonably low in the 
past, low-carbon policy risks have affected investments in developed 
countries. In principle, risk-mitigation instruments and access to long-
term finance can be provided at reasonably low cost. Suitable insti-
tutions exist to implement specialized public finance mechanisms to 
provide dedicated credit lines, guarantees to share the risks of invest-
ments, debt financing of projects, microfinance or incentive funds, and 
schemes to mobilize R&D and technical assistance funds for build-
ing capacities across the sectors. The institutions and types of public 
finance mechanisms in existence across countries are diverse but share 
the common aim of helping commercial financial institutions to effec-
tively and efficiently perform this job (Maclean et al., 2008).
In 2012, the most widespread fiscal incentives were capital subsidies, 
grants, and rebates. They were in place in almost 90 % of high-income 
countries. In 70 % of the countries public funds were used to support 
renewable energy, e. g., public investment loans and grants. Feed-in 
tariffs were in place in 27 high-income countries at national or state 
level (75 % of all countries analyzed) (REN21, 2012).
16.8 Financing mitigation activ-
ities in and for develop-
ing countries including for 
technology development, 
transfer, and diffusion
Analogous to the previous section, this section outlines key assess-
ment results for mitigation finance in and for developing countries, i. e., 
embracing domestic flows as well as financing provided by developed 
countries.
An estimated 51 % of the total global climate finance in 2011 and 
2012, namely on average 182  billion USD per year, was invested in 
developing countries (2011 / 2012 USD). Thereof, 72 % was originating 
in the same country as it was invested) (Buchner et  al., 2013b). The 
total climate finance flowing from developed to developing countries 
is estimated to be between 39 and 120 billion USD per year in 2011 
and 2012 (2011 / 2012 USD). This range covers public and the more 
uncertain flows of private funding for mitigation and adaptation. Clapp 
et al. (2012) estimate the total at 70 – 120 billion USD per year based 
on 2009 – 2010 data. Data from Buchner et al. (2013a) suggest a net 
flow to developing countries for 2010 and 2011 of the order of 40 to 
60 billion USD. North-South flows are estimated at 39 to 62 billion USD 
per year for 2011 and 2012 (2011 / 2012 USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Public climate finance provided by developed countries to developing 
countries was estimated at 35 to 49 billion USD per year in 2011 and 
2012 (2011 / 2012USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b). Multilateral and bilat-
eral institutions played an important role in delivering climate finance 
to developing countries. Seven MDBs30 reported climate finance com-
mitments of about 24.1 and 26.8 billion USD in 2011 and 2012, respec-
tively31 (2011 and 2012 USD) (AfDB et al., 2012a; b, 2013). These insti-
tutions manage a range of multi-donor trust climate funds, such as the 
Climate Investment Funds, and the funds of the financial mechanism of 
the Convention (GEF, SCCF, LDCF). The GCF is expected to become an 
additional international mechanism to support climate activities in 
developing countries. Bilateral climate-related ODA commitments were 
at an average of 20 billion USD per year in 2010 and 2011 (2010 / 2011 
USD) (OECD, 2013a)32 and were implemented by bilateral development 
banks or bilateral agencies, provided to national government directly 
or to dedicated multilateral climate funds (Buchner et al., 2012). How-
ever, bilateral and multilateral commitments are not fully comparable 
due to differences between methodologies.
Climate projects in developing countries showed a higher share of bal-
ance-sheet financing and concessional funding provided by national 
and international development finance institutions than developed 
countries (Buchner et al., 2012). Domestic public development banks 
played an important role in this regard. The 11 non-OECD development 
30 African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
31 The reporting is activity-based allowing counting entire projects but also project 
components. Recipient countries include developing countries and 13 EU member 
states. It covers grant, loan, guarantee, equity, and performance-based instru-
ments, not requiring a specific grant element. The volume covers MDBs’ own 
resources as well as external resources managed by the MDBs that might also be 
reported to OECD DAC (such as contributions to the GEF, CIFs, and Carbon Funds).
32 It covers total funding committed to projects that have climate change mitigation 
or adaptation as a ‘principal’ or ‘significant’ objective. The ODA is defined as 
those flows to countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral 
institutions provided by official agencies or by their executive agencies. Resources 
must be used to promote the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as a main objective and they must be concessional in character (OECD, 
2013a).
Box 16�3 | Least Developed Countries’ investment and finance for low-carbon activities
This box highlights key issues related to investment and 
finance for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), however some 
of these issues are certainly also relevant for other developing 
countries.
Climate change increased the challenges LDCs are facing regard-
ing food, water, and energy that exacerbate sustainable develop-
ment. Most LDCs are highly exposed to climate change effects 
as they are heavily reliant on climate-vulnerable sectors such as 
agriculture (Harmeling and Eckstein, 2012). Most of the LDCs, 
already overwhelmed by poverty, natural disasters, conflicts, and 
geophysical constraints, are now at risk of further devastating 
impacts of climate change. In turn, they contribute very little to 
carbon emissions (Baumert et al., 2005; Fisher, 2013). 
At the same time, LDCs are faced with a lack of access to energy 
services and with an expected increase in energy demand due to 
the population and GDP growth. Of the 1.2 billion people without 
electricity in 2010, around 85 % live in rural areas and 87 % in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia. For cooking, the access 
deficit amounts to 2.8 billion people who primarily rely on solid 
fuels. About 78 % of that population lives in rural areas, and 96 % 
are geographically concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern 
Asia, Southern Asia, and South-Eastern Asia (Sustainable Energy 
for All, 2013) (see Section 14.3.2.1 for other estimates provided by 
the literature). By investing in mitigation activities in the early and 
interim stages, access to clean and sustainable energy can be pro-
vided and environmentally harmful technologies can potentially 
be leapfrogged. Consequently, needs for finance and investment 
are pressing both for adaptation and mitigation. 
Regarding specific mitigation finance needs, there are no robust 
data for LDCs. It is estimated that shifting the large populations 
that rely on traditional solid fuels (such as unprocessed biomass, 
charcoal, and coal) to modern energy systems and expanding 
electricity supply for basic human needs could yield substantial 
improvements in human welfare for a relatively low cost (72 – 95 
billion USD per year until 2030 to achieve nearly universal access) 
(Pachauri et al., 2013). For instance, in Bangladesh, the costs 
to provide a minimum power from solar home system’s energy 
source to off-grid areas was around 285 USD per household 
(World Bank, 2012c). However, the very few country studies on 
mitigation needs and costs are not representative of the whole 
group of LDCs and are not comparable. Data on international and 
domestic private sector activities in LDCs are also lacking, as are 
data on domestic public flows. With respect to North-South flows, 
the OECD DAC reported that developed countries provided 730 
million USD in mitigation related ODA to LDCs in the year 2011. 
Bangladesh received the highest share with 117 million USD, 
followed by Uganda and Haiti with more than 70 million USD 
(OECD, 2012).
Most LDCs have very few CDM projects that are also an impor-
tant vehicle for mitigation (UNFCCC, 2012d; UNEP Risø, 2013). 
To improve the regional distribution of CDM projects, the CDM 
Executive Board has promoted the regulatory reform of CDM 
standards, procedures, and guidelines. Furthermore, stakeholder 
interaction has been enhanced and a CDM loan scheme has been 
established by UNFCCC to provide interest-free loans for CDM 
project preparation in LDCs (UNFCCC, 2012e).
Some LDCs are starting to allocate public funds to mitigation and 
adaptation activities, e. g., NAPAs or national climate funds (Khan 
et al., 2012). However, pressing financial needs to combat poverty 
favour other expenditures over climate-related activities. 
Most LDCs struggle to provide an enabling environment for pri-
vate business activities, a very common general development issue 
(Stadelmann and Michaelowa, 2011). It is noteworthy that among 
the 30 lowest-ranking countries in the World Bank’s Doing Busi-
ness Index, 23 countries are LDCs (World Bank, 2011a). Obstacles 
to general private business activities in turn hinder long-term 
private climate investments (Hamilton and Justice, 2009). Due to 
very high perceived risk in LDCs, risk premiums are very high. This 
is particularly problematic as low-carbon investments are very 
responsive to the cost of capital (Eyraud et al., 2011). In a chal-
lenging environment, it is difficult to implement targeted public 
policies and financial instruments to mobilize private mitigation 
finance. Moreover, the weakness of technological capabilities in 
LDCs presents a challenge for successful development and transfer 
of climate-relevant technologies (ICTSD, 2012).
To develop along a low-carbon growth path, LDCs rely on interna-
tional grant and concessional finance. It is especially important to 
ensure the predictability and sustainability of climate finance for 
LDCs, as these countries are inherently more vulnerable to eco-
nomic shocks due to their structural weaknesses (UNCTAD, 2010).
While all donors and development institutions provide mitigation 
finance to LDCs, there are some dedicated institutional arrange-
ments, such as the LDCF and the SCCF under the Convention. 
Some LDCs have also implemented national funding institutions, 
e. g., Benin, Senegal, and Rwanda in the framework of the Adapta-
tion Fund, or the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund.
While knowledge and data gaps regarding mitigation finance are 
generally higher in developing than in developed countries, they 
are even more severe in LDCs.
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developing countries (2011 / 2012 USD). Thereof, 72 % was originating 
in the same country as it was invested) (Buchner et  al., 2013b). The 
total climate finance flowing from developed to developing countries 
is estimated to be between 39 and 120 billion USD per year in 2011 
and 2012 (2011 / 2012 USD). This range covers public and the more 
uncertain flows of private funding for mitigation and adaptation. Clapp 
et al. (2012) estimate the total at 70 – 120 billion USD per year based 
on 2009 – 2010 data. Data from Buchner et al. (2013a) suggest a net 
flow to developing countries for 2010 and 2011 of the order of 40 to 
60 billion USD. North-South flows are estimated at 39 to 62 billion USD 
per year for 2011 and 2012 (2011 / 2012 USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Public climate finance provided by developed countries to developing 
countries was estimated at 35 to 49 billion USD per year in 2011 and 
2012 (2011 / 2012USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b). Multilateral and bilat-
eral institutions played an important role in delivering climate finance 
to developing countries. Seven MDBs30 reported climate finance com-
mitments of about 24.1 and 26.8 billion USD in 2011 and 2012, respec-
tively31 (2011 and 2012 USD) (AfDB et al., 2012a; b, 2013). These insti-
tutions manage a range of multi-donor trust climate funds, such as the 
Climate Investment Funds, and the funds of the financial mechanism of 
the Convention (GEF, SCCF, LDCF). The GCF is expected to become an 
additional international mechanism to support climate activities in 
developing countries. Bilateral climate-related ODA commitments were 
at an average of 20 billion USD per year in 2010 and 2011 (2010 / 2011 
USD) (OECD, 2013a)32 and were implemented by bilateral development 
banks or bilateral agencies, provided to national government directly 
or to dedicated multilateral climate funds (Buchner et al., 2012). How-
ever, bilateral and multilateral commitments are not fully comparable 
due to differences between methodologies.
Climate projects in developing countries showed a higher share of bal-
ance-sheet financing and concessional funding provided by national 
and international development finance institutions than developed 
countries (Buchner et al., 2012). Domestic public development banks 
played an important role in this regard. The 11 non-OECD development 
30 African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
31 The reporting is activity-based allowing counting entire projects but also project 
components. Recipient countries include developing countries and 13 EU member 
states. It covers grant, loan, guarantee, equity, and performance-based instru-
ments, not requiring a specific grant element. The volume covers MDBs’ own 
resources as well as external resources managed by the MDBs that might also be 
reported to OECD DAC (such as contributions to the GEF, CIFs, and Carbon Funds).
32 It covers total funding committed to projects that have climate change mitigation 
or adaptation as a ‘principal’ or ‘significant’ objective. The ODA is defined as 
those flows to countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral 
institutions provided by official agencies or by their executive agencies. Resources 
must be used to promote the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as a main objective and they must be concessional in character (OECD, 
2013a).
Box 16�3 | Least Developed Countries’ investment and finance for low-carbon activities
This box highlights key issues related to investment and 
finance for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), however some 
of these issues are certainly also relevant for other developing 
countries.
Climate change increased the challenges LDCs are facing regard-
ing food, water, and energy that exacerbate sustainable develop-
ment. Most LDCs are highly exposed to climate change effects 
as they are heavily reliant on climate-vulnerable sectors such as 
agriculture (Harmeling and Eckstein, 2012). Most of the LDCs, 
already overwhelmed by poverty, natural disasters, conflicts, and 
geophysical constraints, are now at risk of further devastating 
impacts of climate change. In turn, they contribute very little to 
carbon emissions (Baumert et al., 2005; Fisher, 2013). 
At the same time, LDCs are faced with a lack of access to energy 
services and with an expected increase in energy demand due to 
the population and GDP growth. Of the 1.2 billion people without 
electricity in 2010, around 85 % live in rural areas and 87 % in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia. For cooking, the access 
deficit amounts to 2.8 billion people who primarily rely on solid 
fuels. About 78 % of that population lives in rural areas, and 96 % 
are geographically concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern 
Asia, Southern Asia, and South-Eastern Asia (Sustainable Energy 
for All, 2013) (see Section 14.3.2.1 for other estimates provided by 
the literature). By investing in mitigation activities in the early and 
interim stages, access to clean and sustainable energy can be pro-
vided and environmentally harmful technologies can potentially 
be leapfrogged. Consequently, needs for finance and investment 
are pressing both for adaptation and mitigation. 
Regarding specific mitigation finance needs, there are no robust 
data for LDCs. It is estimated that shifting the large populations 
that rely on traditional solid fuels (such as unprocessed biomass, 
charcoal, and coal) to modern energy systems and expanding 
electricity supply for basic human needs could yield substantial 
improvements in human welfare for a relatively low cost (72 – 95 
billion USD per year until 2030 to achieve nearly universal access) 
(Pachauri et al., 2013). For instance, in Bangladesh, the costs 
to provide a minimum power from solar home system’s energy 
source to off-grid areas was around 285 USD per household 
(World Bank, 2012c). However, the very few country studies on 
mitigation needs and costs are not representative of the whole 
group of LDCs and are not comparable. Data on international and 
domestic private sector activities in LDCs are also lacking, as are 
data on domestic public flows. With respect to North-South flows, 
the OECD DAC reported that developed countries provided 730 
million USD in mitigation related ODA to LDCs in the year 2011. 
Bangladesh received the highest share with 117 million USD, 
followed by Uganda and Haiti with more than 70 million USD 
(OECD, 2012).
Most LDCs have very few CDM projects that are also an impor-
tant vehicle for mitigation (UNFCCC, 2012d; UNEP Risø, 2013). 
To improve the regional distribution of CDM projects, the CDM 
Executive Board has promoted the regulatory reform of CDM 
standards, procedures, and guidelines. Furthermore, stakeholder 
interaction has been enhanced and a CDM loan scheme has been 
established by UNFCCC to provide interest-free loans for CDM 
project preparation in LDCs (UNFCCC, 2012e).
Some LDCs are starting to allocate public funds to mitigation and 
adaptation activities, e. g., NAPAs or national climate funds (Khan 
et al., 2012). However, pressing financial needs to combat poverty 
favour other expenditures over climate-related activities. 
Most LDCs struggle to provide an enabling environment for pri-
vate business activities, a very common general development issue 
(Stadelmann and Michaelowa, 2011). It is noteworthy that among 
the 30 lowest-ranking countries in the World Bank’s Doing Busi-
ness Index, 23 countries are LDCs (World Bank, 2011a). Obstacles 
to general private business activities in turn hinder long-term 
private climate investments (Hamilton and Justice, 2009). Due to 
very high perceived risk in LDCs, risk premiums are very high. This 
is particularly problematic as low-carbon investments are very 
responsive to the cost of capital (Eyraud et al., 2011). In a chal-
lenging environment, it is difficult to implement targeted public 
policies and financial instruments to mobilize private mitigation 
finance. Moreover, the weakness of technological capabilities in 
LDCs presents a challenge for successful development and transfer 
of climate-relevant technologies (ICTSD, 2012).
To develop along a low-carbon growth path, LDCs rely on interna-
tional grant and concessional finance. It is especially important to 
ensure the predictability and sustainability of climate finance for 
LDCs, as these countries are inherently more vulnerable to eco-
nomic shocks due to their structural weaknesses (UNCTAD, 2010).
While all donors and development institutions provide mitigation 
finance to LDCs, there are some dedicated institutional arrange-
ments, such as the LDCF and the SCCF under the Convention. 
Some LDCs have also implemented national funding institutions, 
e. g., Benin, Senegal, and Rwanda in the framework of the Adapta-
tion Fund, or the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund.
While knowledge and data gaps regarding mitigation finance are 
generally higher in developing than in developed countries, they 
are even more severe in LDCs.
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bank members of IDFC provided 44 billion USD of domestic ‘green’33 
finance in 2011 and 2012 (2011 and 2012 USD) (Höhne et al., 2012; 
IDFC, 2013). 
According to UNFCCC (2011a), Annex  II countries provided an aver-
age of almost 10 billion USD per year of climate finance to develop-
ing countries. In 2009, developed countries committed to provide new 
and additional resources approaching 30 billion USD of ‘FSF’ to sup-
port mitigation and adaptation action in developing countries during 
2010 – 2012. The sum of the announced commitments exceeds 33 bil-
lion USD (UNFCCC, 2011b, 2012b; c, 2013a). Data on the amount actu-
ally disbursed is not available. Some analyses question whether these 
funds were ‘new and additional’ (Brown et al., 2010; Stadelmann et al., 
2010, 2011b).
There is limited robust information on the current magnitude of private 
flows from developed to developing countries. Clapp et al. (2012) esti-
mate the private investment at 37 – 72 billion USD per year based on 
2009 – 2010 data (2008 / 2009 USD) and Stadelmann et al. (2013) esti-
mate foreign direct investment as equity and loans in the range of 10 
to 37 billion USD (2010 and 2008 USD) per year based on 2008 – 2011 
data. 
In reference scenarios as well as in policy scenarios compatible with a 
2 °C warming target in 2100, non-OECD countries absorb the greatest 
share of incremental investments in power generation technologies. 
Without climate policy, investments in the power sector are mainly 
directed towards fossil fuels. About 73 % (65 % to 80 %) of global 
investment in fossil power plants between 2010 – 2029, and 78 % 
(76 to 80 %) between 2030 – 2049, would flow into in the non-OECD 
because many developing countries rely on low-cost coal power plants 
to supply an ever-growing demand of electricity in the scenarios exam-
ined (based on IEA (2011), Carraro et al. (2012), Calvin et al. (2012), 
and McCollum et al. (2013) used in Section 16.2.2). In a climate policy 
scenario compatible with a 2 °C warming limit in 2100, non-OECD 
countries are expected to absorb 51 % (34 % to 66 %) of incremental 
average annual investment in renewables over 2010 – 2029, and 67 % 
(61 % to 73 %) over 2030 – 2049. 
In tackling climate change, developing countries face different types 
and magnitudes of constraints. Out of the 149 assessed develop-
ing countries, only 37 were assigned lower risk country grades. These 
countries, being attractive for international private sector investment 
in low-carbon technologies, represent 38 % of global CO2 emissions. 
However, the majority of developing countries currently exhibits higher 
country risk grades — reflecting less attractive international invest-
33 ‘Green’ finance as reported by IDFC includes projects with other environmental 
benefits. Approximately 93 % (80 %) of the ‘green’ finance by IDFC in 2011 
(2012) was climate finance (Höhne et al., 2012; IDFC, 2013). 
ment conditions — and finds it more difficult to attract foreign private 
investment (Harnisch and Enting, 2013). Moreover, the lack of techni-
cal capacity and training systems is a significant barrier for low-carbon 
investment in many developing economies (Ölz and Beerepoot, 2010). 
Between 2005 and 2009, developed countries provided 2.5 billion 
USD of ODA to support creation of general enabling environments in 
developing countries (2005 – 2009 USD) (Stadelmann and Michaelowa, 
2011).
Since investment risks for low-carbon projects in developing countries 
are typically perceived to be higher than in developed countries, the 
cost of capital and the return requirements of investors are respectively 
higher. The IRR for general infrastructure in developing countries, for 
instance, is a median of 20 % compared to about 12 % in developed 
countries (Ward et  al., 2009). Access to affordable long-term capital 
is limited in many developing countries (Maclean et al., 2008), where 
local banks are not able to lend for 15 – 25 years due to balance sheet 
constraints (Hamilton, 2010), such as the mismatch in the maturity of 
assets and liabilities. In addition, appropriate financing mechanism for 
end-users’ up-take are also often missing (Derrick, 1998). Moreover, 
equity finance is scarce in many developed countries, increasing the 
dependence on project finance. Especially in low-income countries, 
project sponsors frequently rely on external assistance to cover project 
development costs for many investments because of their high risks 
and non-commercial nature (World Bank, 2011d).
Many developing countries use a range of incentives for investments 
in renewable energies (REs), especially fiscal incentives (OECD, 2013d). 
Public financing instruments to stimulate RE, such as public invest-
ment, loans, or grants, were in place in 57 % of the countries analyzed 
and FITs were established in 39 developing countries in 2012 (REN21, 
2012). Carbon pricing has not yet widely been adopted by develop-
ing countries, apart from the non-perfect carbon price incentive via the 
CDM. However, currently new ETS are set up, planned, or under con-
sideration in some developing countries such as China (provinces and 
cities), Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Chile, Brazil, and South Korea, but it will 
take time until such ETS will be fully operational and provide enough 
investment certainty (Kossoy et al., 2013).
Regional groupings such as the ECOWAS, the ASEAN, and the Merco-
sur, have been actively promoting sub-regional integration of energy 
systems and cooperation in climate change activities.
On the national level, there is an on-going attempt to cope with 
the multiplicity of sources, agents, and channels offering financial 
resources for climate action (Glemarec, 2011). Most developing coun-
tries rely on relevant ministries and agencies chaired by the ministry 
of the environment or finance to coordinate climate change finance 
(Gomez-Echeverri, 2010). Some developing countries are establishing 
national implementing entities and funds that mainstream climate 
change activities into overall development strategies. Often these insti-
tutions are designed to blend international funding with domestic and 
private sector resources (Flynn, 2011).
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16.9 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data 
Scientific literature on investment and finance for low-carbon activities 
is still very limited and knowledge gaps are substantive. 
•	 Common definitions and data availability. To date there are no 
common definitions for central concepts related to climate finance 
or financial accounting rules. Neither are there complete or rea-
sonably accurate data on current climate finance and its compo-
nents, namely developed country sources or commitments, devel-
oping country sources or commitments, international flows, and 
private vs. public sources. The role of domestic and South-South 
flows and domestic investments in developing countries is also not 
adequately understood and documented. Frequently it is not pos-
sible to distinguish exactly between adaptation and development 
finance, since they are closely interconnected. Another difficult 
assessment is on the differences between funding under the ODA 
and ‘new and additional’ funds available. Important metrics like 
the high-carbon investment by sub-sector and region, the carbon 
intensity of new investments, downward deviations from reference 
emission pathways, or the cost-effectiveness of global mitigation 
investments are not tracked systematically. 
•	 Model outputs and approaches. Only very limited model results 
exist for additional investments and incremental costs to abate 
CO2 emissions in sectors other than energy supply, e. g., via energy 
efficiency in industry, buildings, and transport, as well as in other 
sectors like forestry, agriculture, and waste, or to mitigate process 
and non-CO2 emissions in the petroleum and gas, cement, and 
chemical industry, or from refrigeration and air conditioning. Very 
limited analysis has been published that takes a globally consis-
tent perspective of incremental investments and costs at the level 
of nation states and regions. This perspective could enrich the sci-
entific discussion because global and regional netting approaches 
among sectors and sub-sectors may fall short of the complexity of 
real political decision making processes.
•	 A comprehensive and transparent treatment of investment and 
technology risks in energy models is not available. The impact of 
fuel price volatility on low-carbon investments is generally not 
considered. Reasonably robust quantitative results of the need for 
additional R&D for low-carbon technologies and practices and on 
the timing of these needs (infrastructure and technology deploy-
ment roadmaps) are not available. While there is literature on miti-
gation technology diffusion and transfer in general, it is not clear 
whether specific financial requirements to this end are different 
from finance for other mitigation activities.
•	 For the energy sector, there is no convergence on the order of mag-
nitude of net incremental investment costs across its sub-sectors. 
Interactions of stringent climate policies with overall growth and 
investment of individual economies and the world economy as a 
whole are also not yet well understood.
•	 Effectiveness and efficiency of climate finance� Knowledge 
about enabling environments for effective deployment of climate 
finance in any country is insufficient. There is very limited empirical 
evidence to relate the concept of low-carbon activities to macro 
determinants from a cross-country perspective. More research is 
especially needed regarding determinants for mitigation invest-
ment in LDCs.
•	 There is only case-specific knowledge by practitioners on the selec-
tion and combination of instruments that are most effective at 
shifting (leveraging) private investment to mitigation and adapta-
tion. There is no general understanding of what are the efficient 
levers to mobilize private investment and its potential in any coun-
try (since they will differ by investment and country). 
•	 The effectiveness of different public climate finance channels in 
driving low-carbon development is insufficiently analyzed. Esti-
mates of the incremental cost value of public guarantees, export 
insurances, and non-concessional loans of development banks 
would provide valuable insights. Little is known on determinants 
for an economically efficient and effective allocation of public 
climate finance. A comprehensive assessment of the interrelation 
between private and public sector actors in sharing incremental 
costs and risks of mitigation investments, for example, via conces-
sional loans or guarantee instruments has not been undertaken 
yet. 
•	 There is no agreement yet which institutional arrangements are 
more effective at which level (international — national — local) and 
for what investment in which sector. However, an understanding of 
the key determinants of this efficiency and of the nature of a future 
international climate policy agreement is needed first.
•	 Balance between mitigation and adaptation finance and 
investment� The optimal balance, including its time dimension, 
is a difficult exercise given the lack of modelling of any direct 
interaction between adaptation and mitigation in terms of their 
specific effectiveness and tradeoffs. A better-informed assessment 
of the effective integration of mitigation and adaptation, includ-
ing tradeoffs and cost avoidance estimates, is needed. Moreover, 
there is limited research and literature to assess synergies and 
tradeoffs between and across sector-specific mitigation and adap-
tation measures from the specific financing and investment point 
of view.
1238
Cross-cutting Investment and Finance Issues
16
Chapter 16
16.10 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 16�1 What is climate finance?
There is no agreed definition of climate finance. The term ‘climate 
finance’ is applied both to the financial resources devoted to address-
ing climate change globally and to financial flows to developing 
countries to assist them in addressing climate change. The literature 
includes multiple concepts within each of these broad categories. 
There are basically three types of metrics for financial resources 
devoted to addressing climate change globally� Total climate 
finance includes all financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce 
net greenhouse gas emissions and / or to enhance resilience to the 
impacts of climate variability and the projected climate change. This 
covers private and public funds, domestic and international flows, 
expenditures for mitigation and adaptation, and adaptation to current 
climate variability as well as future climate change. It covers the full 
value of the financial flow rather than the share associated with the 
climate change benefit; e. g., the entire investment in a wind turbine 
rather than the portion attributed to the emission reductions. The incre-
mental investment is the extra capital required for the initial invest-
ment to implement a mitigation or adaptation measure, for example, 
the investment in wind turbines less the investment that would have 
been required for a natural gas generating unit displaced. Since the 
value depends on a hypothetical alternative, the incremental invest-
ment is uncertain. The incremental costs reflect the cost of capital of 
the incremental investment and the change of operating and main-
tenance costs for a mitigation or adaptation project in comparison to 
a reference project. It can be calculated as the difference of the net 
present values of the two projects. Values depend on the incremental 
investment as well as projected operating costs, including fossil fuel 
prices, and the discount rate. 
Financial flows to assist developing countries in addressing cli-
mate change typically cover the following three concepts. The total 
climate finance flowing to developing countries is the amount of the 
total climate finance invested in developing countries that comes from 
developed countries. This covers private and public funds for mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Public climate finance provided to developing 
countries is the finance provided by developed countries’ governments 
and bilateral institutions as well as multilateral institutions for mitiga-
tion and adaptation activities in developing countries. Private climate 
finance flowing to developing countries is finance and investment by 
private actors in / from developed countries for activities in develop-
ing countries. Under the UNFCCC, climate finance is not well-defined. 
Annex II Parties provide and mobilize funding for climate related activ-
ities in developing countries. Most of the funds provided are conces-
sional loans and grants.
FAQ 16�2 How much investment and finance 
is currently directed to projects that 
contribute to mitigate climate change 
and how much extra flows will be 
required in the future to stay below the 
2 °C limit?
Current climate finance was estimated at around 359 billion USD per 
year of which 337 billion USD per year was invested in mitigation 
using a mix of 2011 and 2012 data (2011 / 2012 USD). This covers the 
full investment in mitigation measures, such as renewable energy gen-
eration technologies that also produce other goods or services. Climate 
finance invested in developed countries amounted to 177 billion USD 
and in developing countries 182 billion USD (2011 / 2012 USD). 
Climate policy is expected to induce a significant change in invest-
ment pattern in all scenarios compatible with a 2 °C limit. Based on 
data from a limited number of scenarios, there would need to hap-
pen a remarkable reallocation of investments in the power sector 
from fossil fuels to low-emissions generation technologies (renew-
able power generation, nuclear, and electricity generation with CCS). 
While annual investment in conventional fossil-fired power plants 
without CCS is estimated to decline by about 30 billion USD per year 
in 2010 – 2029 (i. e., by 20 % compared to 2010), annual investment 
in low-emission generation technologies is expected to increase by 
about 147 billion USD per year (i. e., by 100 % compared to 2010), 
over the same period.
Investment in energy efficiency in the building, transport, and industry 
sector would need to increase by several hundred billion USD per year 
from 2010 – 2029. Information on investment needs in other sectors, 
e. g., CO2 to abatement processes or non-CO2 emissions, is sparse. 
Model results suggest that deforestation could be reduced against cur-
rent deforestation trends by 50 % with an investment of 21 to 35 bil-
lion USD annually.
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